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ABSTRACT
Approximation Algorithms for Effective Team Formation
by
George Rabanca
Advisor: Professor Amotz Bar-Noy
This dissertation investigates the problem of creating multiple disjoint teams of maximum
efficacy from a fixed set of workers. We identify three parameters which directly correlate
to the team effectiveness – team expertise, team cohesion and team size – and propose
efficient algorithms for optimizing each in various settings. We show that under standard
assumptions the problems we explore are not optimally solvable in polynomial time, and
thus we focus on developing efficient algorithms with guaranteed worst case approximation
bounds. First, we investigate maximizing team expertise in a setting where each worker has
different expertise for each job and each job may be completed only by teams of certain sizes.
Second, we consider the problem of maximizing team cohesion when the set of workers form
a social network with known pairwise compatibility. Third, we explore the problem from a
game theoretic perspective in which multiple teams compete on a fixed number of workers
and the true needs of each team are private. We present allocation algorithms that both
incentivize teams to state their needs accurately and allocate workers effectively. Finally,
we experimentally measure the correlation between team cohesiveness, team expertise and
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In our increasingly globalized society governments, companies and other organizations need
to assemble teams of growing complexity to tackle problems on a larger scale than ever
before. While it is clear that some teams are more effective than others, and numerous studies
analyze the mutifaceted qualities that correlate with team performance, bringing together
such highly competent groups is still as much of an art as a science. This, we argue, is at least
in part due to the computational complexity of the optimization problems intrinsic to finding
such solutions, and thus in this dissertation we study efficient approximation algorithms for
idealized versions of these problems.
Over the last three decades, stemming from the work on group dynamics of Kurt Lewin
[1], researchers in psychology, social sciences and management have produced a large body
of literature aimed at understanding the factors determining the performance of groups of
people working together. One of the major obstacles to this understanding is having a robust
definition of the concept of team success. While, for example, a team manager might define
success as the timely completion of an individual task, a team member might find improved
social relations within the team and personal growth just as important or more [2]. Although
in this work we only concern ourselves with the correlation between team performance and
1
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the individual qualities of the team members, it is worth noting that team composition is only
one of multiple factors that affect team success. For example, Daniel Levi [3] distinguishes
three other major factors that determine team efficacy: the task at hand (how well suited is
the task for team work), the group process (how well does the internal structure of the team
work) and the organizational context (how much support does the team get from the larger
organization).
It is unsurprising that, as Bennis and Biederman show [4], good teams are comprised
good team members. However, other factors of the team composition have also been found
to correlate with team performance. For example heterogenous groups have been found to be
more innovative than homogenous groups [5], more cohesive teams have better performance
in certain tasks [6], and without a doubt larger teams outperform teams of smaller size in
many tasks [7].
In this dissertation we take a computational approach to understand the complexities of
efficient team formation. While many of the qualities of teams discussed above are hard or
even impossible to objectively and precisely measure, and moreover, it is not well understood
how these characteristics offset and complement each other to determine a team’s efficacy,
we focus our attention to much simplified versions of the real-world problems. We focus
on three axis on which team quality can be measured – expertise, cohesion and size – and
show that even in this idealized setting some of the natural optimization problems arising
from searching for optimally performing teams on any of these axis are computationally
intractable. Therefore, we aim to find efficient algorithms that are guaranteed to output
solutions with provable approximation guarantees in polynomial time.
In Chapter 2 we investigate a team formation setting where the goal is to maximize
cumulative team expertise when each worker has different expertise for each job and jobs
can only be completed by teams of specific sizes. In graph theoretic terms this setting
is captured by the SeminarAssignment Problem [8] which is NP-complete in general.
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We provide an efficient algorithm that guarantees a constant approximation ratio while
identifying conditions under which the problem becomes computationally tractable.
Next, we study a setting where a set of workers must be partitioned into teams in a way
that maximizes team cohesiveness. We propose two measures for team cohesiveness based
on pairwise collaboration scores for each pair of workers which are captured by well studied
graph partition problems. This motivates Chapter 3 where we study novel approximation
algorithms for two well known graph partition problems: the 2-PathPartition problem
[9–12] and the TrianglePacking problem [9, 13].
In Chapter 4 we investigate two game theoretic models of the problem. This setting
focuses on the team size while individual workers’ expertise is ignored. Given that the
true needs of each team are private information to each team’s manager our goal is to find
mechanisms that, under common game theoretic assumptions, guarantee efficient worker
allocation even when team leaders intend to manipulate the mechanism to be allocated as
many workers as possible.
In Chapter 5 we take an experimental approach to the study of team cohesiveness. We
analyze a DBLP dataset with 45,191 authors and investigate how author expertise and pre-
vious collaboration among a paper’s authors correlate with the success (number of citations)
of the paper. We observe that in this dataset not all pairwise collaborations are equally im-
portant, and that the two measures for team cohesiveness we propose have similar accuracy




In this chapter, based on work presented at WAOA 2016 [14], we consider a setting where a
set of workers must be allocated to a set of teams in a way that maximizes the total expertise
of the workers to the assigned team. More precisely, let B be a set of teams (or bins) and let
I be a set of workers (or items), and for each worker i and team b let p(i, b) ∈ R represent the
expertise (or profit) of the worker i when assigned to team b. Moreover, assume that each
team b ∈ B must be assigned one of several number of workers, and let the set of integers Kb
denote the allowable number of workers that can be assigned to team b. A team assignment
is a function A : I → B and we say that the assignment is feasible if |A−1(b)|∈ Kb for all
b ∈ B, where A−1 is the pre-image of A. The goal is to find a feasible team assignment A





The problem has been introduced in a slightly less general form by Krumke et. al. as
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the Seminar Assignment problem (SAP) [8]. In their version for each b ∈ B the set Kb
equals to {0} ∪ {lb, ..., ub} for some lower and upper bounds lb, ub ∈ N. The more general
setting considered in this work can be useful for example when a team doesn’t just require
a minimum number of workers and has a fixed maximum size, but in addition requires
workers to work in pairs and therefore would allow only teams of even size. Moreover, this
generalization also simplifies notation and helps simplify the exposition of our algorithm.
SAP is a variant of the classic General Assignment problem (GAP) in which one is
given m bins with capacity B1, ..., Bm and n items. Each item i has size s(i, b) in bin b and
yields profit p(i, b). The goal is to find a packing of the items into the bins that maximizes
total profit, subject to the constraint that no bin is overfilled. A GAP instance with a single
bin is equivalent to the knapsack problem, and a GAP instance with unit profit can be
interpreted as a decision version of the bin packing problem: can all items be packed in the
m bins? The SAP problem can be seen as a variant of GAP with unit item sizes and more
strict capacity constraints.
SAP is also related to the Maximum Coverage problem (MC). In the classic version
of the MC problem one is given a collection of sets S = {S1, ..., Sm} and a budget B. The
goal is to select a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S with cardinality less than or equal to B such that
|∪S∈S′S| is maximized. In Section 2.2 we show how the existing hardness of approximation
bounds for MC can be extended to SAP.
The algorithms with the best approximation ratio for both MC and GAP are greedy
algorithms and the approximation bounds have been proved with similar techniques. In this
chapter we show how to extend these analysis techniques to SAP.
2.1.1 Related Work.
In [8] the authors show that SAP is NP-complete even when Kb = {0, 3} for all b ∈ B and
p(i, b) ∈ {0, 1} for any i ∈ I. Moreover, they show that SAP does not admit a PTAS by
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providing a gap-preserving reduction from the 3-bounded 3-dimensional matching problem.
In [15] the authors investigate the approximability of the problem and provide a randomized
algorithm which they claim outputs a solution that in expectation has value at least 1/3.93
of the optimal. In [16] this result is revised and the authors show that for any c ≥ 2, their






and has an approximation ratio of e−1
(2c−1)·e .
The GAP is well studied in the literature, with [17] and [18] surveying the existing algo-
rithms and heuristics for multiple variations of the problem. In [19] the authors provide a
2-approximation algorithm for the problem and in [20] it is shown that any α-approximation
algorithm to the knapsack problem can be transformed into a (1 + α)-approximation algo-
rithm for GAP. In [21] tight bounds for the GAP are given showing that no polynomial time
algorithm can guarantee a solution within a factor better than 1− e−1, unless P = NP , and
providing an LP-based approximation which for any ε > 0 outputs a solution with profit
within a 1− e−1 − ε factor of the optimal solution value.
The GAP with minimum quantities, in which a bin cannot be used if it is not packed
at least above a certain threshold, is introduced in [8]. Because items have arbitrary size,
it is easy to see that when a single bin is given and the lower bound threshold equals the
bin capacity, finding a feasible solution with profit greater than zero is equivalent to solving
Subset Sum. Therefore, in its most general case the problem cannot be approximated in
polynomial time, unless P = NP .
In [22] and [23] the authors study the problem of maximizing a non-decreasing submod-
ular function f satisfying f(∅) = 0 under a cardinality constraint. They show that a simple
greedy algorithm achieves an approximation factor of 1 − e−1 which is the best possible
under standard assumptions. Vohra and Hall note that the classic version of the maximum
coverage problem belongs to this class of problems [24]. When each set Si in the MC prob-
lem is associated with a cost c(Si) the Budgeted Maximum Coverage problem asks to
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find a collection of sets S ′ covering the maximum number of elements under the (knapsack)
constraint that
∑
Si∈S′ c(Si) ≤ B for some budget B ∈ R. Khuller et. al. [25] show that
the greedy algorithm combined with a partial enumeration of all solutions with small cardi-
nality also achieves a 1− e−1 approximation guarantee, and provide matching lower bounds
which hold even in the setting of the classic MC problem (when all sets have unit cost). In
[26] Sviridenko generalizes the algorithm and proof technique to show that maximizing any
monotone submodular function under a knapsack constraint can be approximated within
1− e−1 as well.
2.1.2 Contributions.
In Section 2.2, by a reduction from the Maximum Coverage problem, we show that there
exists no polynomial time algorithm that guarantees an approximation factor larger than
1−e−1, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(nlog logn). Section 2.3 introduces some of the techniques used
in the later sections and shows that a greedy algorithm provides a 1 − e−1 approximation
guarantee when the allowable number of workers that can be assigned to any team b is a set
Kb = {0, kb} for some integer kb. In Section 2.4 we present a greedy algorithm that outputs
a solution that has profit at least 1
2
· (1 − e−1) of the optimal solution. The algorithm is
based on the observation that when the required number of workers in each team is fixed, the
problem is solvable in polynomial time. Finally, in Section 2.5 we show how this algorithm
can be improved to guarantee an approximation bound of 1− e−1.
2.2 Hardness of Approximation
In this section we show that the problem is hard to approximate within a factor of (1−e−1+ε),
∀ε > 0, even for the case when for each b ∈ B the set Kb equals {0, n} for some integer n,
and the profit for assigning any worker to any team is either 0 or 1. We prove this result by
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showing that such restricted instances of SAP are as hard to approximate as the Maximum
Coverage problem defined below.
Definition 2.2.1. Given a collection of sets S = {S1, ..., Sm} and an integer k, the Maxi-
mum Coverage (MC) problem is to find a collection of sets S ′ ⊆ S such that |S ′|≤ k and
the size of the union of the sets in S ′ is maximized.
In [25] it is shown that the MC problem is hard to approximate within a factor of
1− e−1 + ε, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(nlog logn). We use this result to prove the following:
Theorem 2.2.1. For any ε > 0 the SAP problem is hard to approximate within a factor of
1− e−1 + ε unless NP ⊆ DTIME(nlog logn).
Proof. To prove the theorem we create a SAP instance for any given MC instance and show
that from any solution of the SAP instance we can create a solution for the MC instance with
at least equal value, and that the optimal solution of the SAP instance has value at least
equal to the optimal solution of the MC instance. Therefore, an α-approximation algorithm
for SAP can be transformed into an α-approximation algorithm for MC.
Given a MC instance, let U = ∪S∈SS and n = |U |. For each set S ∈ S let bS be a team
with the allowable number of workers Kb = {0, n}, and for each element e ∈ U let ie be a
worker in I. The profit of a worker ie assigned to a team bS is 1 if the element e belongs to
the set S and 0 otherwise. In addition, let d1, ..., dn∗(k−1) be dummy workers that have profit
0 for any team.
We first show that any feasible assignment A corresponds to a valid solution to the given
MC instance. Since every team requires exactly n workers and there are exactly k ·n workers
available, clearly at most k teams can be assigned workers in any feasible assignment. Let
S ′ = {S ∈ S : A(bS) > 0}. It is easy to see that the number of elements in ∪S∈S′S is at least
equal to the profit p(A) since a worker ie has profit 1 for a team bS only if the set S covers
element e.
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It remains to show that for any solution to the MC instance there exists a solution to
the corresponding SAP instance with the same value. Fix a collection of sets S ′ ⊆ S with
|S ′|≤ k. For every e ∈ ∪S∈S′S let Se be a set in S ′ that contains e and let A(ie) = bSe .
Then, assign additional dummy workers to any team with at least one worker to reach the
required n workers per team. Clearly, the profit of the assignment A is equal to the number
of elements covered by the collection S ′, which proves the theorem.
2.3 Teams of Fixed Size
In this section we show that when the allowable number of workers that can be assigned to
any team b is a set Kb = {0, kb} for some integer kb, SAP can be approximated within a
factor of 1 − e−1 in polynomial time. This introduces some of the techniques used in the
general case in a simpler setting.
For an instance of the SAP, a team-size selection is a function S : B → N with the
property that S(b) ∈ Kb for any b ∈ B. We say that S is feasible if
∑
b∈B S(b) ≤ |I|.
In other words, a team-size selection is a function that maps each team to the number of
workers to be assigned to it. A team-size selection S corresponds to an assignment A if for
any team b the number of workers assigned by A to b is S(b). We slightly abuse notation
and denote by p(S) the maximum profit over all team assignments corresponding to the
team-size selection S; we call p(S) the profit of S. In the remainder of this chapter for a
graph G = (V,E) we denote the subgraph induced by the vertices of X ⊆ V by G[X].
Definition 2.3.1. Given a SAP instance let Vb = {vb,1, ..., vb,kb} for every b ∈ B and let V =⋃
b∈B Vb. The bipartite representation of the instance is the complete bipartite graph G = (V ∪
I, E) with edge weights ω(vb, i) = p(i, b) for every vb ∈ Vb. The bipartite representation of a
team-size selection S is the graph G[VS ∪ I] where VS =
⋃
b∈B VS,b and VS,b = {vb,1, ..., vb,S(b)}
for every b ∈ B.
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Lemma 2.3.1. For any SAP instance and any feasible team-size selection S, p(S) is equal
to the value of the maximum weight matching in the bipartite representation of S.
Proof. Let GS = (VS ∪ I, E) be the bipartite representation of S. First observe that any
matching M of GS that matches all the vertices of VS can be interpreted as an assignment
AM of equal value by setting AM(i) = b whenever vertex i ∈ I is matched by M to a vertex
in VS,b. Since GS is complete and has non-negative edge weights, there exists a maximum
weight matching that matches all the vertices of VS.
Similarly, any feasible assignment for the SAP instance can be interpreted as a matching
MA of equal value, which proves the lemma.
Definition 2.3.2. For a given finite set A, a set function f : 2A → R is submodular if for
any X, Y ⊆ A it holds that:
f(X) + f(Y ) ≥ f(X ∪ Y ) + f(X ∩ Y ).
Sviridenko shows that certain submodular functions can be maximized under knapsack
constraints, which will be useful in proving Theorem 2.3.4:
Theorem 2.3.2 ([26]). Given a finite set A, a submodular, non-decreasing, non-negative,
polynomially computable function f : 2A → R, a budget L ≥ 0, and costs ca ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A,










We relate now the value of a maximum weight matching in a bipartite graph to the notion
of submodularity.
Definition 2.3.3. For an edge weighted bipartite graph G = (A∪B,E), the partial maximum
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weight matching function f : 2A → R maps any set S ⊆ A to the value of the maximum
weight matching in G[S ∪B].
Lemma 2.3.3. Let f be the partial maximum weight matching function for a bipartite graph
G = (A ∪B,E) with non negative edge weights. Then f is submodular.
Proof. Fix two sets X, Y ⊆ A and let M∩ and M∪ be two matchings for the graphs G[(X ∩
Y )∪B] and G[(X ∪Y )∪B] respectively. To prove the lemma it is enough to show that it is
possible to partition the edges in M∩ and M∪ into two disjoint matchings MX and MY for
the graphs G[X ∪B] and G[Y ∪B] respectively.
The edges of M∩ and M∪ form a collection of alternating paths and cycles. Let C denote
this collection and observe that no cycle of C contains vertices from X \ Y or Y \X. This
holds because M∩ does not match those vertices.
Let PX be the set of paths in C with at least one vertex in X \ Y and let PY be the set
of paths in C with at least one vertex in Y \X. Two such paths are depicted in Fig. 2.1.
Claim 1. PX ∩ PY = ∅.
Proof of claim: Assume by contradiction that there exists a path P ∈ PX ∩PY . Let x be
a vertex in X \Y on path P and similarly let y be a vertex in Y \X on path P . Observe that
since neither x nor y belong to X ∩ Y they do not belong to the matching M∩ by definition,
and therefore they are the endpoints of the path P . Moreover, since both x and y are in A,
the path P has even length and since it is an alternating path, either the first or last edge
belongs to M∩. Therefore M∩ matches either x or y contradicting its definition.
For a set of paths P we let E(P) = {e ∈ P : P ∈ P}. Moreover, let
MX = (E(PX) ∩M∪) ∪ (E(C \ PX) ∩M∩)
and
MY = (E(PX) ∩M∩) ∪ (E(C \ PX) ∩M∪).
CHAPTER 2. TEAM EXPERTISE 12
X Y
PYPX
Figure 2.1: MX∪Y matches each vertex in X ∪ Y to the vertex directly above it. MX∩Y is
depicted with contiguous segments, MX with dotted segments andMY with dashed segments.
Two alternating paths of P are shown in light gray.
It is clear that MX ∪MY = M∩ ∪M∪ and MX ∩MY = M∩ ∩M∪. To prove the theorem it
remains to show that MX and MY are valid matchings for G[X∪B] and G[Y ∪B] respectively.
To see that MX is a valid matching for G[X ∪ B] observe first that no vertex of Y \ X is
matched by MX since PX does not intersect Y \X by Claim 1, and M∩ does not intersect
Y \X by definition. Therefore, MX only uses vertices of X ∪B. Second observe that every
vertex x ∈ X is matched by at most one edge of MX since otherwise x belongs to either two
edges of M∪ or two edges of M∩, contradicting the definition. This proves that MX is a valid
matching for G[X ∪B]; showing that MY is a valid matching for G[Y ∪B] is similar.
Theorem 2.3.4. Any instance of SAP in which |Kb|≤ 2 for all b ∈ B can be approximated
in polynomial time to a factor of 1− e−1.
Proof. Fix a SAP instance and for any X ⊆ B let SX be the team-size selection which
allocates kb workers to any team in S and 0 workers to any team in B \ S. Moreover, let G
be the bipartite representation of the SAP instance and f be the partial maximum weight
matching function for graph G. Denote by G[VX ∪ I] the bipartite representation of SX
and let g(X) = f(VX). Since f is submodular by Lemma 2.3.3, it is easy to see that g is
submodular as well. Assume by contradiction that there exist sets X, Y ⊆ B such that the
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submodularity condition for g doesn’t hold:
g(X) + g(Y ) < g(X ∪ Y ) + g(X ∩ Y ). (2.1)
Therefore, by definition of g we have
f(VX) + f(VY ) < f(VX ∪ VY ) + g(VX ∩ VY ),
contradicting the submodularity of f proven in Lemma 2.3.3.
Clearly g is also monotone, non-negative and polynomially computable. Let cb = kb,
∀b ∈ B, let L = |I|, and observe that SX is feasible if and only if
∑
x∈X cx ≤ L. Moreover,
by Lemma 2.3.1 and the definition of g, g(X) = p(SX) whenever the team-size selection SX
is feasible and therefore the proof follows from Theorem 2.3.2.
2.4 A Constant Factor Greedy Algorithm
The algorithm presented in this section sequentially increments the number of workers al-
located to each team in a greedy fashion. It is similar in nature to the greedy algorithm
of [25] and [26] but the details of the approximation guarantee proof are different. In the
rest of this section we denote by AS an optimal assignment for the team-size selection S.
Remember that Lemma 2.3.1 shows that given feasible team-size selection S, an optimal
team assignment AS can be found in polynomial time.
We say that a team-size selection T is greater than a selection S (denoted by T  S)
if T (b) ≥ S(b), ∀b ∈ B, and there exists b ∈ B s.t. T (b) > S(b). The cost of a team-size
selection S is denoted by c(S) and equals
∑
b∈B S(b). When T  S we define the marginal
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cost of T relative to S as the difference between the cost of T and the cost of S:
cS(T ) = c(T )− c(S)
Similarly, we define pS(T ) = p(T )− p(S), the marginal profit of T relative to S. We say
that T is an incrementing selection for a team-size selection S if T  S and there exists a
single team for which the selection T allocates more workers than selection S; more precisely,
the cardinality of the set {b ∈ B : T (b) > S(b)} is 1. For a selection S we denote the set of
incrementing team-size selections that are feasible by inc(S).
We are now ready to present our algorithm:
Greedy
1. S0 = initial team-size selection;
2. i = 0;
3. While inc(Si) 6= ∅:
(a) Si+1 ← arg maxS′∈inc(Si)(p(S ′)− p(Si))/(c(S ′)− c(Si));
(b) i← i+ 1
4. A1 ← ASi ;
5. A2 ← maximum assignment to any single team b for which S0(b) = 0;
6. Return arg max{p(A1), p(A2)};
In this section we analyze the algorithm starting from an empty initial team-size selection.
In the following section we show that by running the algorithm repeatedly with different
initial team-size selections, the approximation guarantee can be improved.
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Observe that the cardinality of inc(S) is never greater than |B|·|I| and is therefore
polynomial in the size of the input. Thus, using the maximum weight matching reduction
from the proof of Lemma 2.3.1, step 3(a) of the algorithm can be performed efficiently.
Definition 2.4.1. For a team-size selection S and a tuple (b, kb) with b ∈ B and kb ∈ N, let
S ⊕ (b, kb) denote the team-size selection S ′ with S ′(b) = max{kb, S(b)} and S ′(b′) = S(b′)
for any b′ ∈ B, b′ 6= b.
Lemma 2.4.1. For any feasible team-size selections S and T , if for every team b ∈ B the
team-size selection S ⊕ (b, T (b)) is feasible, then it holds that:
∑
b∈B
[p(S ⊕ (b, T (b)))− p(S)] ≥ p(T )− p(S).
Proof. For a fixed SAP instance let G be its bipartite representation and let G[VS ∪ I] and
G[VT ∪I] be the bipartite representations of S and T respectively. Moreover, let MS and MT
be two maximum weight matchings in G[VS ∪ I] and G[VT ∪ I] respectively. Remember that
according to Lemma 2.3.1 it holds that p(S) = ω(MS) and p(T ) = ω(MT ). To prove the
lemma we create matchings M = {Mb}b∈B for the bipartite representations of assignments
p(S⊕ (b, T (b)), such that each edge of MT is used in exactly one of the matchings inM and
each edge of MS is used in exactly |B|−1 of the matchings in M.
Let C be the collection of isolated components formed by the union of the edges of MS
and MT . Since both MS and MT are matchings in G, each element of C is a path or cycle
in G. For every b ∈ B let Pb = {P ∈ C : V (P ) ∩ Vb ∩ (V (MT ) \ V (MS)) 6= ∅}, where V (P )
denotes the vertices of component P (Fig. 2.2).
Claim 2. For any a 6= b ∈ B, Pa ∩ Pb = ∅.
Proof: Assume that there exists a path or cycle P ∈ Pa ∩ Pb for some a 6= b ∈ B. Then
by definition there exist va ∈ Va and vb ∈ Vb such that va, vb ∈ V (P ) and va, vb /∈ V (MS)
and therefore va and vb are the endpoints of the alternating path P . Since neither of the














Figure 2.2: An example with 3 teams, b1, b2, b3. (a) Two assignments MS
(dashed edges) and MT (dotted edges); the three alternating paths formed
by MS ∪MT (light gray). q(P1) = b1 because it only intersects vertices from
Vb1 ; q(P2) = b1 because P2 contains a vertex V (MT ) \ V (MS) that is in Vb1 ;
r(P3) = b2. (b), (c) and (d) assignments for team-size selections S ⊕ (b1, 3),
S ⊕ (b2, 2) and S ⊕ (b3, 2) combining edges of MS and MT .
endpoints of the path belong to MS, P must have an odd number of edges. However, because
both endpoints of P belong to the same partition of the bipartite graph G, the path P must
have an even number of edges, hence the claim holds by contradiction.
Let q : C → B be a map of the isolated components to the teams with the following
properties:
1. q(P ) ∈ {b ∈ B : V (P ) ∩ Vb 6= ∅};
2. if P ∈ Pb for any b ∈ B, q(P ) = b.
Since Pb are disjoint by the previous claim and since for any team b it holds by definition
that V (P ) ∩ Vb 6= ∅ whenever P ∈ Pb, it is clear that such a mapping q exists.
For every b ∈ B let Mb be the matching of G that uses all the edges of MT from the
alternating paths P ∈ C mapped by q to the team b, and all the edges of MS from the paths
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P ∈ C mapped by q to some other team:
Mb = [MT ∩ E(q−1(b))] ∪ [MS ∩ (E(C) \ E(q−1(b)))].
Observe that any edge of MT belongs to at least one matching Mb for some b ∈ B and
that any edge of MS belongs to all but one of the matchings Mb. Therefore,
∑
b∈B
ω(Mb) ≥ ω(MT ) + (|B|−1) · ω(MS).
Moreover, observe that for each b ∈ B, Mb is a matching in the bipartite representation
of the team-size selection S ⊕ (b, T (b)). Therefore p(S ⊕ (b, T (b))) = ω(Mb) and the lemma
follows.
Lemma 2.4.2. Let S and T be two team-size selections such that S ⊕ (b, T (b)) is feasible
for every b ∈ B. Let S∗ = arg maxS′∈inc(S)(p(S ′)− p(S))/(c(S ′)− c(S)). Then it holds that:
p(S∗)− p(S)
c(S∗)− c(S)
≥ p(T )− p(S)
c(T )
.
Proof. By Lemma 2.4.1 we have that
∑
b∈B
[p(S ⊕ (b, T (b)))− p(S)] ≥ p(T )− p(S). (2.2)
Since
∑
b∈B[c(S ⊕ (b, T (b)))− c(S)] ≤
∑
b∈B T (b) = c(T ), inequality (2.2) implies that
∑
b∈B[p(S ⊕ (b, T (b)))− p(S)]∑
b∈B[c(S ⊕ (b, T (b)))− c(S)]
≥ p(T )− p(S)
c(T )
. (2.3)
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Then, there exists at least one team b∗ ∈ B such that
p(S ⊕ (b∗, T (b∗)))− p(S)
c(S ⊕ (b∗, T (b∗)))− c(S)
≥ p(T )− p(S)
c(T )
. (2.4)
Since S ⊕ (b∗, T (b∗))) is clearly in inc(S) the lemma follows directly from Eq. (2.4) and
the definition of S∗.
Lemma 2.4.3. Let T be a feasible team-size selection and let r ∈ N be such that Si⊕(b, T (b))















Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the iterations i. By the definition of the al-
gorithm, S1 is the team-size selection with maximum marginal density in inc(S0), and thus
Lemma 2.4.2 shows that the inequality holds for i = 1. Suppose that the lemma holds for
iterations 1, ..., i. We show that it also holds for iteration i + 1. For ease of exposition, for
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p(Si+1)− p(S0) = p(Si)− p(S0) + p(Si+1)− p(Si)
≥ p(Si)− p(S0) + αi · (p(T )− p(Si))
= (1− αi)p(Si) + αi · p(T )− p(S0)


























where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2.4.2 and the second inequality follows from
the induction hypothesis.





Proof. Let OPT be the team-size selection of a fixed optimal assignment solution for the
given SAP instance. Let b∗ ∈ B be the team that is allocated the most workers in OPT and
let OPT ′ be the team-size selection for which OPT ′(b∗) = 0 and OPT ′(b) = OPT (b) for any
b 6= b∗ ∈ B. Let r be the first iteration of the algorithm for which c(Sr) > c(OPT ′). Clearly,
Si ⊕ (b, OPT (b)) is feasible for every i < r and b ∈ B. Since p(S0) = 0, by applying Lemma
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· p(OPT ′). (2.5)
Observe that c(Sr) =
∑r−1
k=0 c(Sk+1) − c(Sk) and that for any real numbers a0, ..., ar−1
with
∑r−1













Therefore Eq. (2.5) implies p(Sr) > (1− e−1) · p(OPT ′). Since the profit of A2 is at least
p(b∗, OPT (b∗)) it holds that
p(A1) + p(A2) > (1− e−1) · p(OPT ′) + p(b∗, OPT (b∗))
≥ (1− e−1) · p(OPT )
and therefore either p(A1) or p(A2) is greater than or equal to 12 · (1− e
−1)p(OPT ).
2.5 Improving the Approximation
In this section we show that the algorithm can be improved by starting the greedy algorithm
not from an empty team-size selection, but from a team-size selection that is part of the
optimal solution. The improved algorithm is less efficient but achieves the optimal approx-
imation ratio of 1 − e−1. Let Aopt be an optimal team assignment and for any b ∈ B let
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Clearly, the profit of the optimal solution is
∑
b∈B popt(b). W.l.o.g, let b1, b2, b3 be the three
teams of the optimal solution with highest profit and let S∗ be a team-size selection such
that S∗(b) = OPT (b) if b ∈ {b1, b2, b3}, and S∗(b) = 0 otherwise.
Theorem 2.5.1. When S0 = S
∗ the Greedy algorithm is a (1− e−1)-approximation for
SAP.
Proof. Let OPT be the team-size selection corresponding to Aopt. Let b∗ be the team that
is allocated the most workers in OPT and is not allocated workers in S∗. Moreover, let
OPT ′ be the team-size selection for which OPT ′(b∗) = 0 and OPT ′(b) = OPT (b) for any
b 6= b∗ ∈ B. Let r be the first iteration of the algorithm for which c(Sr) > c(OPT ′). Clearly,
the team-size selection Si ⊕ (b, OPT (b)) is feasible for every i < r and b ∈ B. By applying




























By applying Eq. (2.6) we obtain that
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and therefore
p(Sr) ≥ (1− 1/e) · p(OPT ′) + p(S∗)/e
≥ (1− 1/e) · p(OPT )− popt(b∗) + p(S∗)/e. (2.7)
By hypothesis S∗ selects the three teams with maximum profit in the optimal assignment
and allocates exactly as many workers to each as OPT does. Then, since popt(b
∗) ≤ popt(bi)
for i = 1, ..., 3 it holds that p(S∗) ≥ 3 · popt(b∗) > e · popt(b∗) and the theorem follows.
Observe that the number of feasible team-size selections assigning workers to at most
three teams is polynomial in the size of the input. Therefore, by repeatedly calling the
greedy algorithm with all possible such selections our main result follows:
Corollary 2.5.2. There exists a polynomial time (1−e−1)-approximation algorithm for SAP.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for the Seminar Assign-
ment Problem and provided matching lower bounds. As mentioned in the introduction, our
algorithm analysis is similar in nature to the analysis of the greedy algorithms for a few
other different problems. To simplify future research it would be very useful to identify the




In this chapter, based on work published at ESA 2015 [27], we consider a setting where a
social network of workers must be partitioned into small teams with the goal of maximizing
team cohesion. More precisely, assume that a social network of workers is given as a complete
weighted graph G, where each node of G represents a worker and the weight of the edge
between two workers represents the compatibility between the two workers. We define the
cohesion of a team with a leader as the sum of the compatibility of each worker with the team
leader, and the cohesion of a flat team (with no team leader) as the sum of the compatibility
of every pair of workers within the team. In this chapter we present some algorithms for
partitioning the social network in small teams with and without leader, with the goal of
maximizing the sum of the teams’ cohesiveness, as defined above.
Observe that if one desires to partition the network into teams of size 2, there is no
distinction between teams with leader and teams without leader. Moreover, the problem is
equivalent with the well studied Maximum Weight Matching problem which can be solved
optimally in polynomial time [28, 29]. Therefore we focus our attention to teams of size
23
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3. Observe that in this case allocating workers to teams with a leader is equivalent to
partitioning the soial network graph into paths of length 2, and allocating the workers
to leader-less teams of size 3 is equivalent to partitioning the graph into triangles. Both
problems are NP-complete and have been studied before from an approximation perspective
[9, 11–13].
3.1.1 Problem definition
For some integer k > 0 let G be a complete graph on 3k vertices having non-negative edge
weights. The Maximum Weight 2-path Partition (M2PP) problem asks to compute a
set of k vertex disjoint paths of length 2 (referred to as 2-paths) such that the sum of the
weights of the paths is maximized. The Maximum Weight Triangle Partition (MTP)
problem asks to compute a set of k vertex disjoint cycles of length 3 (referred to as triangles)
such that the sum of the edge weights of the k cycles is maximized. For the remainder of
this work G will refer to a complete graph on 3k vertices having non-negative edge weights.
Our main contribution is a 7/12-approximation algorithm for the M2PP problem. We
also investigate {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs – in which the weights of the edges of the input
graph are either 0 or 1 – and we present a .75-approximation algorithm for the M2PP problem
and a .6-approximation algorithm for the MTP problem in this setting.
Both the M2PP and MTP problems have been studied before, mostly under the names
Maximum 2-Path Packing and Maximum Triangle Packing respectively. Unfortu-
nately, these names have also been used for the related but different problems defined below.
Consequently, we use separate terminology to make a clear distinction between the packing
and partitioning settings.
Given an unweighted graph H, a 2-Path Packing of H is a collection of vertex dis-
joint 2-paths and a Triangle Packing of H is a collection of vertex disjoint triangles.
Such a collection is called perfect if it uses all the vertices of H. The Maximum 2-Path
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Packing problem asks to find a 2-Path Packing of maximum cardinality. The Maximum
Triangle Packing problem is defined similarly.
3.1.2 Related work.
In their classic book Garey and Johnson [30] show that deciding whether a graph admits
a perfect Triangle Packing or a perfect 2-Path Packing is NP-complete (p. 68 and
76 respectively). More general results on the NP-completeness of packing families of graphs
into a given graph are shown by Hell and Kirkpatrick [31], and Lonc [32]. Both the Max-
imum 2-Path Packing and Maximum Triangle Packing problems are special cases
of the unweighted 3-Set Packing problem for which Hurkens and Schrijver [33] (also see
Halldórsson [34]) presents a local search algorithm that achieves a 2
3
− ε approximation (with
ε > 0).
Kann [35] shows that the Maximum Triangle Packing is APX-hard even in graphs
of maximum degree 4 and Chleb́ık and Chleb́ıková [36] show that Maximum Triangle
Packing is NP-hard to approximate within a factor of .9929. Moreover, Guruswami et.
al. [37] show that the problem remains NP-complete even when restricted to the families
of chordal, planar, line or total graphs. A .833-approximation algorithm for graphs with
maximum degree 4 is presented by Manić and Wakabayashi [38].
For Maximum 2-Path Packing problem van Bevern et. al. [39] study its computa-
tional complexity on multiple classes of special graphs. The authors provide a quasilinear-
time algorithm for the problem on interval graphs and polynomial time algorithms for the
more general Star Partition problem on cographs and on bipartite permutation graphs.
Moreover, the authors show that the problem is NP -hard even on grid graphs with maxi-
mum degree three. Prieto and Sloper [40] present a fixed parameter tractable algorithm and
Babenko and Gusakov [41] present an approximation algorithm for an edge-weighted version
of the problem.
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The M2PP and MTP problems studied in this chapter are special cases of the weighted
3-Set Packing problem for which Arkin and Hassin [42] present a 1
2
− ε approximation
algorithm. M2PP and MTP are special cases because all sets of size three exist and have non-
negative weights, and the weight of each set is determined by the weights of the included
subsets of size two. Hassin et al. [9] observe that there exists a simple reduction from
M2PP (respectively, MTP) to the problem of deciding whether a graph has a perfect 2-Path
Packing (resp., Triangle Packing), implying that the two problems are NP-complete.
Moreover, they present a randomized 35
67
− ε ≈ .5222 approximation algorithm for M2PP
and Tanahashi and Chen [10] refine and derandomize this algorithm, leading to an improved
approximation ratio of .5265−ε; van Zuylen [11] presents a simpler analysis of this algorithm.
For the MTP problem, Hassin and Shlomi Rubinstein [9] (see also Erratum [43]) presents a
43
83
− ε ≈ .518 approximation algorithm and Chen et. al. [13] (see also Erratum [44]) present
a randomized approximation algorithm which achieves a ratio of .5257. For {0, 1}-edge-
weighted graphs, Hassin and Schneider [12] present a local search based .55-approximation
algorithm for M2PP which runs in time O(|V |10). Hassin and Rubinstein [45] also study
the problem of partitioning a complete weighted graph into paths of length 3, and present a
.75-approximation algorithm.
3.1.3 Contribution.
In this chapter we present a simple, matching based 7/12 ≈ .583-approximation algorithm
for the M2PP problem on graphs with general non-negative weights, improving upon the
(.5265 − ε)-approximation algorithm of Tanahashi and Chen [10]. Besides improving the
approximation ratio, our algorithm is significantly less computationally intensive since the
constant factor for the algorithm of Tanahashi and Chen is exponential in 1/ε. Moreover,
for {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs we provide a .75-approximation algorithm for the M2PP
problem improving upon the .55-approximation algorithm of Hassin and Schneider [12]. The
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core idea of our algorithms is adapted from Hassin and Rubinstein [45], where the authors
show how to partition a complete weighted graph into paths of length 3. For a complete
graph on n = 3k vertices we prove the following two theorems in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4
respectively.
Theorem 3.1.1. There exists a 7/12-approximation algorithm for the M2PP problem run-
ning in time O(n2.5).
Theorem 3.1.2. For {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs there exists a 3/4-approximation algorithm
for the M2PP problem running in time O(n2.5).
In Section 3.5 we show how an approximation algorithm for M2PP can be combined
with a 3-Set Packing approximation algorithm to obtain an approximate solution for the
MTP on {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs. We are not aware of any previous results for the MTP
problem restricted to this case.
Theorem 3.1.3. For {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs there exists a 5/8-approximation algorithm
for the MTP problem running in time O(n2.5).
3.1.4 Motivation.
Besides being interesting variants of the Maximum 2-Path Packing and Maximum 2-
Path Packing problems, M2PP and MTP are natural special cases of the Team Forma-
tion problem. Given a social network of experts, the Team Formation problem asks to
find the most cohesive team. Some authors [46–49] measure the cohesiveness of a team as
the number of connections within a team, while others [39, 47] consider only connections
between a team leader and the other team members. Experimental evidence presented by
Baumer et. al. [50] suggests that indeed, not all ties between team members are of equal im-
portance, and maximizing the connection between the team leader and the rest of the group
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suffices. If we are interested in forming multiple teams, the Team Formation problem for
teams of size 3 can be cast as either M2PP or MTP, depending on whether we are forming
teams with or without a leader respectively.
3.2 Preliminaries
Some of the graphs we argue about in this chapter refer to non-simple graphs that have
parallel edges and self-loops. To avoid confusion we begin by formally defining the notion
of a graph as used in the remaining of this work. A graph G = (V,E, γ) is a set of vertices
V together with a set of edges E and a function γ : E → {{u, v} : u, v ∈ V }. For an edge
e ∈ E with γ(e) = {u, v} we call the vertices u and v the endpoints of the edge e. Two edges
e1, e2 ∈ E are called parallel if γ(e1) = γ(e2), and an edge e ∈ E is called a loop if γ(e) = {v}
contains a single element. For clarity, we sometimes use V (G) and E(G) to denote the vertex
and edge set of the graph G respectively. We say that the graph G is complete if for any
vertices u 6= v in V (G) there exists an edge e ∈ E(G) such that γ(e) = {u, v}, and we say
that the graph G is simple if it contains no loops or parallel edges. In an edge-weighted
graph each edge e ∈ E is associated with a weight ω(e). We slightly abuse notation by using
ω(A) to denote the sum of the weights of the edges in an edge set A, and by using V (A) to
denote the set of endpoints of edges in A. Moreover, we use ω(G) to denote the sum of the
weights of the edges in E(G). For a set of 2-paths Π we use E(Π) to denote the set of edges
used by the 2-paths of Π and ω(Π) to denote the sum of the weights of the edges in E(Π).
For an edge e ∈ E, let Ve, Ee and γe be defined as follows:
• Ve = (V \ γ(e)) ∪ {ve} for some new vertex ve /∈ V . We say that e is the edge of G
corresponding to ve, and vice versa.
• Ee = E \ {e}
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• for any edge f ∈ Ee, γe(f) is defined as:
γe(f) =

γ(f) if γ(f) ∩ γ(e) = ∅,
(γ (f) \ γ(e)) ∪ {ve} otherwise.
We define G/e = (Ve, Ee, γe), the graph resulting from contracting the edge e. For a set of
edges A we denote by G/A the graph obtained from G by sequentially contracting all edges
of A.
3.3 M2PP in graphs with non negative edge-weights
In this section we present and analyze the WeightedDoubleMatching approximation
algorithm for the Maximum Weight 2-path Partition (M2PP) problem in graphs with
general non-negative weights. We first restrict our attention to the case when k is even. In
section 3.3.7 we show how to extend the algorithm to graphs with odd k.
The WeightedDoubleMatching algorithm (Fig. 3.1) takes as input a weighted com-
plete simple graph G = (V,E, ωG, γG), with |V |= 3k, and in the first step it computes a
perfect maximum weight matching M1 of G. If needed, M1 may use edges of weight 0 so
that all vertices are matched. Therefore, the size of M1 is 3k/2. In the second step, it
contracts the edges of M1 to obtain a graph H and assigns to each edge e in H the weight
ωH(e) ≡ ωG(e)−min{ωG(a), ωG(b)}, (3.1)
where a and b are the edges in M1 corresponding to the endpoints of e. Observe that that H
is graph with |V (H)|= 3k/2 and since every vertex in H corresponds to two vertices of G,
there are four parallel edges between any two vertices of H. Intuitively, the choice of ωH(e)
internalizes the loss of weight in the final solution due to the fact that for each edge e in
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M2, one of the two edges of M1 adjacent to e is not being used in the final solution. This
intuition is made precise in Lemma 3.3.1.
In the next step, a maximum weight matching M2 of size exactly k/2 is computed in
H based on the edge weight function ωH . Observe that some of the edges in M2 may have
negative weights in H. The matching M2 determines how the edges of M1 are combined into
the output 2-paths:
• for each edge e ∈ M2, let a, b ∈ M1 be the edges corresponding to the endpoints of e,
with ωG(a) ≥ ωG(b); create a 2-path {a, e}, and call the vertex of b not incident to e a
residual vertex.
• for each edge a ∈ M1 corresponding to a vertex of H not matched by M2, create a
2-path from a and an arbitrary residual vertex.
We denote by A1 the set of 2-paths created that contain an edge of M2 and the remaining
2-paths by A2. Notice that the size of A1 is k/2 since the size of M2 is k/2 and each 2-path
in this set uses an edge of M2. Moreover, the size of A2 is also k/2 since there are exactly
k/2 vertices of H not matched by M2, and each 2-path in A2 corresponds to one such vertex.
The algorithm outputs the set of 2-paths A = A1∪A2. A formal description of the algorithm
is presented in Fig. 3.1.
3.3.1 Example.
In Fig. 3.2 we illustrate the main steps of the WeightedDoubleMatching algorithm on
a simple complete graph on six vertices (therefore k = 2). Fig. 3.2(a) shows the complete
graph G with the zero weight edges omitted, and for each non-zero edge its corresponding
weight. The optimal solution of weight 4 is drawn in light gray and a possible maximum
weight matching M1 is displayed in bold (red). Fig. 3.2(b) shows the positive weight edges
of the graph H. All the illustrated edges have weight 1 in the graph G and have weight
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Input: complete simple weighted graph G = (V,E, ωG, γG).
1. M1 ← maximum weight perfect matching of G of size 3k/2.
2. H ← G/M1; H is a complete graph with 3k/2 vertices and four parallel edges between
any two vertices.
3. Let ωH : E(H)→ R be an edge weight function defined as follows:
ωH(e) ≡ ωG(e)−min{ωG(a), ωG(b)},
where a and b are the edges of M1 corresponding to the two endpoints of e.
4. M2 ← maximum weight matching of H (based on ωH) with |M2|= k/2.
5. Let Q be the set of k/2 vertices of H not matched by M2.
6. Create two sets of 2-paths A1 and A2 as follows:
• A1: k/2 many 2-paths, each formed from an edge e ∈ M2 and one of the edges
a, b ∈ M1 corresponding to the endpoints of e. If ωG(a) ≥ ωG(b), create a 2-path
from a and e and call the unused vertex of b a residual vertex. Denote by R be
the set of k/2 residual vertices.
• A2: k/2 many 2-paths, each formed from an edge of G corresponding to a vertex
of Q (not matched by M2), and an arbitrary residual vertex from R.
7. Return A ← A1 ∪ A2.
Figure 3.1: The WeightedDoubleMatching Algorithm



















Figure 3.2: Illustration of a tight example (see Section 3.3.1).
1 − 2/3 in H. A maximum matching M2 of size k/2 = 1 is shown in bold (blue). Finally,
Fig. 3.2(c) shows a possible output of the algorithm, with the dotted segment denoting an
edge of zero weight. The weight of the output solution is 7/3 which is a 7/12 fraction of the
weight of the optimal solution.
3.3.2 Algorithm analysis overview.
In the remainder of Section 3.3 unless otherwise specified G refers to the complete simple
weighted graph given as input to the algorithm, M1 and M2 refer to the matchings found
by the WeightedDoubleMatching in step 1 and 4 respectively, H denotes the graph
G/M1 resulting from contracting the edges of M1 in G and ωH is an edge weight function
on E(H) as defined in step 3 of the algorithm. Moreover, we denote by Π the set of 2-paths
in an arbitrary fixed 2-path partition.
We show that the algorithm outputs a solution of weight at least 7/12 ·ωG(Π). In Lemma
3.3.1 we show that the weight of the output solution is at least the weight of the matching M1
in G plus the weight of the matching M2 in H, i.e., by denoting the weight of the algorithm
solution by ωG(A), we show that
ωG(A) ≥ ωG(M1) + ωH(M2). (3.2)
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In Lemma 3.3.5 we lower bound the weight of the edges of Π in the graph H
ωH(E(Π) \M1) ≥ ωG(Π)− 4/3 · ωG(M1), (3.3)
and in Lemma 3.3.8 we lower bound the weight of the matching M2 in H:
ωH(M2) ≥ ωH(E(Π) \M1)/4. (3.4)
Combining inequalities (3.3) and (3.4) it follows that:
ωH(M2) ≥ ωG(Π)/4− ωG(M1)/3. (3.5)
Furthermore, since one can form a matching by selecting the heaviest edge of each 2-path in
Π and arbitrarily match the remaining vertices, the following holds:
ωG(M1) ≥ ωG(Π)/2. (3.6)
Theorem 3.1.1. WeightedDoubleMatching is a 7/12-approximation algorithm for the
M2PP problem and runs in time O(k2.5).
Proof. Observe that the most time consuming part of the WeightedDoubleMatching
algorithm is computing the matchings M1 and M2, which can be computed in time O(k
2.5)
[29]. The approximation guarantee follows from the following:
ωG(A) ≥ ωG(M1) + ωH(M2)
≥ 2/3 · ωG(M1) + ωG(Π)/4
≥ 7/12 · ωG(Π),
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where first inequality is due to Ineq. (3.2), the second inequality is due to Ineq. (3.5) and
the last inequality is due to Ineq. 3.6.
3.3.3 Bounding the algorithm solution weight
Remember that the DoubleMatchingAlgorithm uses only k edges out of the 3k/2
edges of matching M1. As stated above, the edge-weight function ωH is crafted specifically
to incorporate this loss in the weight of the matching M2. The following lemma proves that
this is the case.
Lemma 3.3.1. ωG(A) ≥ ωG(M1) + ωH(M2).
Proof. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the k/2 edges of M2 and the k/2
many 2-paths of A1. For an edge e ∈ M2 let a, b ∈ M1 be the edges of G corresponding
to the endpoints of e, and w.l.o.g assume that ωG(a) ≥ ωG(b). If π ∈ A1 is the 2-path
formed from edge e, then by construction ωG(π) = ωG(a) + ωG(e). Therefore, since ωG(b) =
min{ωG(a), ωG(b)} we have:
ωG(π) = ωG(a) + ωG(b) + ωG(e)−min{ωG(a), ωG(b)}
= ωG(a) + ωG(b) + ωH(e),
where the second equality follows directly from the definition of ωH . Summing over all 2-









There is also a one-to-one correspondence between the k/2 vertices of Q (the vertices of
H not matched by M2) and the k/2 many 2-paths of A2. For a vertex vc ∈ Q, let πc ∈ A2
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be the corresponding 2-path and let c ∈ M1 be the edge corresponding to vc. Then clearly
ωG(πc) ≥ ωG(c) since any 2-path containing edge c has weight at least ωG(c). Summing over





Combining Eq. (3.7) and (3.8) yields:






ωH(e) = ωG(M1) + ωH(M2)
and thus proving the lemma.
3.3.4 Intermezzo: uniformly c-sparse graphs and fair supply func-
tions.
Our overarching goal is to bound the difference of the weight of the edges of Π in G and
the weight of the edges of Π in H. To this end, in this section we extend Courcelle’s notion
of uniform c-sparseness ([51]) to edge-weighted graphs and prove some general facts about
edge-weighted uniform c-sparse graphs. The main result of this section is Lemma 3.3.4 which,




min{χ(v) : v endpoint of e in G}. (3.9)
Remember that by definition ωH(e) ≡ ωG(e) − min{ωG(a), ωG(b)} and observe that when
the set of edges E is set to E(Π), expression (3.9) relates to ωG(E(Π))− ωH(E(Π)).
In the next section we show that the edges of Π in H form in fact a uniformly 4/3-sparse
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subgraph and use Lemma 3.3.4 to upper bound ωH(E(Π)). For the rest of this section, for
a graph G = (V,E, ω, γ) and S ⊆ V , we denote the graph induced by the vertices of S by
G[S].
Definition 3.3.1. An edge-weighted graph G = (V,E, ω, γ) is called uniformly c-sparse, if
for any S ⊆ V it holds that ω(G[S]) ≤ c · |S|. An unweighted graph G is called uniformly
c-sparse if for any S ⊆ V it holds that |E(G[S])|≤ c · |S|.
Lemma 3.3.2. Let G = (V,E, ω, γ) be a weighted uniformly c-sparse graph and let S, T ⊆ V
be such that ω(G[S]) = c·|S| and ω(G[T ]) = c·|T |. Then it holds that ω(G[S∪T ]) = c·|S∪T |.
Proof. Since G is c-sparse it holds by definition that
ω(G[S ∪ T ]) ≤ c · |S ∪ T |. (3.10)
Moreover, ω(G[S ∪ T ]) ≥ ω(G[S]) + ω(G[T ])− ω(G[S ∩ T ]) and since ω(G[S]) = c · |S| and
ω(G[T ]) = c · |T | it holds that
ω(G[S ∪ T ]) ≥ c · |S|+c · |T |−ω(G[S ∩ T ]). (3.11)
By definition of c-sparseness it holds that ω(G[S ∩ T ]) ≤ c · |S ∩ T |, which combined with
(3.11) implies
ω(G[S ∪ T ]) ≥ c · |S|+c · |T |−c · |S ∩ T |= c · |S ∪ T |. (3.12)
Inequalities (3.10) and (3.12) prove the lemma.
We introduce now the notion of a node supply function which captures a setting in which
the edges of a graph require resources that are provided by each edge’s incident nodes. Each
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edge’s weight represents the amount of resource it needs and a node supply function defines
the amount of resource each node provides to each incident edge.
Definition 3.3.2. For an edge-weighted graph G = (V,E, ω, γ), we define a node supply
function to be a function f : V × E → R satisfying the following properties:
1. for any loop l ∈ E with γ(l) = {v}, f(v, l) = ω(l).
2. for any edge e ∈ E with γ(e) = {u, v} and u 6= v, f(u, e) + f(v, e) = ω(e).
3. for any edge e and vertex v /∈ γ(e), f(v, e) = 0.
In the following lemma we show that for a c-sparse graph there exists a node supply
function that distributes the load on the nodes fairly, in the sense that each node supplies
at most c units of resource. In Lemma 3.3.4 we use such a fair node supply function in a
counting argument to bound Exp. (3.9) which is the main goal of this section.
Lemma 3.3.3. For any uniformly c-sparse weighted graph G = (V,E, ω, γ) there exists a
node-supply function f : V × E → R, with
∑
e∈E
f(v, e) ≤ c, ∀v ∈ V. (3.13)
We call such a function a fair node-supply function.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction over the number of vertices in the graph G. If
the graph G contains a single vertex v, all edges of G are loops and therefore the graph is
uniformly c-sparse only if
∑
e∈E ω(e) ≤ c. By choosing f(v, e) = ω(e) for any e ∈ E, f is a
valid node supply function that satisfies Equation (3.13).
Assuming that a supply function satisfying Ineq. (3.13) exists for any graph on n −
1 vertices, we show that such a function exists for any graph on n vertices. Let Gn =
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(Vn, En, ωn, γn) be an uniformly c-sparse graph with |Vn|= n, and for a vertex v ∈ Vn denote
by In(v) the set of edges incident to v in Gn, not including loops.
We create a graph Gn−1 = (Vn−1, En−1, ωn−1, γn−1) with n − 1 vertices by removing an
arbitrary vertex u and any loops of u from Gn i.e., Vn−1 = Vn \ {u} and En−1 = En \ {l :
γn(l) = {u}}. For any edge e ∈ En−1 we let γn−1(e) = γn(e) \ {u}, meaning that all edges in
In(u) are loops in Gn−1.
Observe that if for any edge e /∈ In(u) we let ωn−1(e) = ωn(e) and for all edges e ∈ In(u)
we let ωn−1(e) = 0, the graph Gn−1 is c-sparse. This is true because for any S ⊆ Vn−1 it
holds that ωn−1(G[S]) = ωn(G[S]) ≤ c · |S|.
Let ωn−1(e) = ωn(e) for any e /∈ In(u) and let ωn−1(e) ≤ ωn(e) be the maximum value
that leaves the graph Gn−1 c-sparse. Therefore, ωn−1(e) < ωn(e) only if there exists a subset
Se of Vn−1 such that γn−1(e) ⊆ Se and ωn−1(Gn−1[Se]) = c · |Se|.
Let fn−1 be a node supply function for the graph Gn−1 satisfying Equation (3.13). We
create a supply function fn for Gn by letting each node of Gn−1 supply resources as defined
by function fn−1, and letting node u supply any additional resource. To complete the proof
we show that the newly created supply function is fair.
For any v 6= u let fn(v, e) = fn−1(v, e) for all e ∈ En−1, and fn(v, e) = 0 for any other
edge e ∈ En \ En−1 (the loops of u). Moreover, let fn(u, ·) be defined as follows:
(a) fn(u, e) = 0 for any e ∈ En with u /∈ γn(e);
(b) fn(u, e) = ωn(e)− fn(v, e) for any e ∈ En with γn(e) = {u, v} and u 6= v;
(c) fn(u, e) = ωn(e) for any e ∈ En with γn(e) = {u}.
Claim: fn is a fair node supply function for the graph Gn.
Fix a vertex v ∈ Vn, v 6= u. By definition of fn it holds that fn(v, e) = fn−1(v, e) for any
edge e ∈ En−1 and that fn(v, e) = 0 for any edge e ∈ En \En−1. Therefore,
∑
e∈En fn(v, e) =∑
e∈En−1 fn−1(v, e) and Equation (3.13) holds by induction hypothesis.
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It remains to prove the lemma for vertex u. Remember that In(u) denotes the set of
non-loop edges incident to u in Gn, and let E ⊆ In(u) be the set of non-loop edges for which
fn(u, e) > 0. Therefore, for every e ∈ E , γn(e) = {u, v}, there exists a vertex set Se ⊆ Vn−1
with v ∈ Se, such that ωn−1(Gn−1[Se]) = c · |Se|. Let S =
⋃
e∈E Se, then by Lemma 3.3.2 we
have that
ωn−1(Gn−1[S]) = c · |S|. (3.14)
Partition the set of edges of Gn[S ∪ {u}] into three sets:
• A := E(Gn[S]);
• B := {e : γ(e) ∩ S 6= 0;u ∈ γ(e)};
• C := {e : γ(e) = {u}}.
Thus, A is the set of edges not incident to u, B is the set of non-loop edges incident to u
and C is the set of loops of u. Observe that by definition of ωn−1 it holds that
ωn(A) = ωn−1(A). (3.15)
Observe that by definition of Gn−1 all edges e ∈ B with γn(e) = {u, v} are loops of v in Gn−1,
and remember that by the definition of a node supply function fn−1(e) = ωn−1(v) for any
loop e of v. Therefore, item (b) of the definition of fn implies that ωn(e) = ωn−1(e)+fn(u, e)
for every e ∈ B and summing over all edges of B it holds that




Moreover, item (c) of the definition of fn implies ωn(e) = fn(u, e) for every e ∈ C and thus,
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Remember that sets A,B and C form a partition of the edges of Gn[S]) and therefore, by
summing over Eq. (3.15)-(3.17), it holds that:
ωn(Gn[S ∪ {u}]) = ωn(A) + ωn(B) + ωn(C)











where the last equality hods because by the definition of the graph Gn−1 the set of edges of
Gn−1[S] is the set A ∪ B and because the definition of fn implies that fn(u, e) = 0 for any
e /∈ B ∪ C. By using Eq. (3.14) in Eq. (3.18) we obtain




and since Gn is a c-sparse graph it holds that ωn(Gn[S ∪ {u}]) ≤ c · (|S|+1). Therefore∑
e∈En fn(u, e) ≤ c, which proves the claim and the lemma.
We are now ready to prove the main lemma of this section which uses a fair node-supply
function to bound Exp. (3.9).
Lemma 3.3.4. Let G = (V,E, γ, ω) be a uniformly c-sparse graph with ω(e) = 1,∀e ∈ E,
and let χ : V → R be a vertex weight function. Then,
∑
e∈E
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Proof. Let f be a fair node-supply function for the graph G. Then for every edge e ∈ E it
holds that
min{χ(v) : v ∈ γ(e)} =
∑
v∈γ(e)




f(v, e) · χ(v), (3.19)
where the equality follows from the fact that
∑
v∈γ(e) f(v, e) = 1 by the definition of a node-
supply function and the inequality follows from the fact that min{χ(v) : v ∈ γ(e)} ≤ χ(v)
for any e ∈ E. By summing over all e ∈ E we obtain
∑
e∈E

















where the first inequality follows from Equation (3.19), the equality follows by rearranging
terms, and the second inequality is due to the fact that the function f satisfies Equation
(3.13).
3.3.5 Bounding the weight of E(Π) in H.
We are now ready to bound the weight of the edges of the 2-partition Π in the graph H
derived from the input graph G by contracting the edges of the maximum weight matching
M1 and modifying the weight of the remaining edges according to Equation (3.1). Remember
that H has no self-loops, has four parallel edges between any two vertices, and may have
negative weight edges. The idea of the proof is to show that the edges of Π form a 4/3-
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sparse graph after the endpoint identification of the edges of M1 in G, and use Lemma 3.3.4
to bound the difference ωG(E(Π))− ωH(E(Π) \M1). The endpoint identification operation
defined below is similar to the edge contraction, with the difference that the contracted edge
is not removed but instead it becomes a loop in the new graph.
Definition 3.3.3. (Endpoint Identification) Given a graph G = (V,E, γ) the endpoint iden-
tification of an edge e ∈ E results in graph G′e = (V ′e , E ′e, γ′e) with
• vertex set V ′e = (V (G) \ γ(e)) ∪ {ve} for some vertex ve /∈ V (G),
• edge set E ′e = E and
• γ′e is defined as:
γ′e(f) =

γe(f) if γ(f) ∩ γ(e) = ∅,
(γ (f) \ γ(e)) ∪ {ve} otherwise.
We say that ve corresponds to e and vice versa. Observe that the edge e is a loop of ve in
G′e.
Lemma 3.3.5. ωH(E(Π) \M1) ≥ ωG(E(Π))− 4/3 · ωG(M1).
Proof. Let FΠ be the unweighted graph resulting from the input graph G after the endpoint
identification of all edges in M1, and after removing any edges that are not in E(Π). Observe
that all edges of E(Π)∩M1 are loops in FΠ and all edges of E(Π) \M1 are non-loops in FΠ.
Claim: FΠ is a 4/3-sparse graph.
Assume for contradiction that there exists a set of edges S ⊆ E(FΠ) such that
|S|> 4/3 · |VF (S)|,
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where VF (S) is the set of endpoints of the edges in S in the graph FΠ. Let VG(S) be the
set of endpoints of the edges in S in the graph G. Since any vertex of FΠ corresponds to an
edge in G, it holds that |VG(S)|≤ 2 · |VF (S)|. Therefore, it holds that
|S|> 2/3 · |VG(S)|.
Let S1, ..., Sp be the set of independent components of S in G. Clearly, |S|= |S1|+...+|Sp|
and |VG(S)|= |VG(S1)|+... + |VG(Sp)|. Therefore there exist at least one S∗ ∈ {S1, ..., Sp}
such that
|S∗|> 2/3 · |VG(S∗)|. (3.20)
However, S∗ is a subset of the edges of Π in G and therefore S∗ is either a 2-path or a single
edge. If S∗ is a 2-path then |S∗|= 2 and |VG(S∗)|= 3, otherwise |S∗|= 1 and |VG(S∗)|= 2,
thus contradicting Inequality (3.20) and proving the claim. 
Let χ : V (FΠ) → R be a node weight function with χ(va) ≡ ωG(a) for all va ∈ V (FΠ),











By the choice of χ we have
∑




min{χ(v) : v endpoint of e in G} ≤ 4
3
· ωG(M1). (3.21)
To simplify the following argument, let µ(e) ≡ min{χ(v) : v endpoint of e in FΠ} for any
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We split the left term of Ineq. (3.21) according to whether the edge e is a loop or not. As
observed above, the loops in FΠ are exactly the edges of E(Π) ∩M1, and therefore it holds







Let e be an edge of FΠ with endpoints va and vb, corresponding to edges a and b of
M1 respectively. Remember that χ(va) = ωG(a) and χ(vb) = ωG(b) by definition of χ
and therefore µ(e) = min{ωG(a), ωG(b)}. The definition of ωH (Eq. 3.1), can therefore be
rewritten as
ωH(e) = ωG(e)− µ(e).




















CHAPTER 3. TEAM COHESION 45










= ωG(E(Π))− ωH(E(Π) \M1).
By using Eq. (3.22) to bound the left term it holds that
4
3
· ωG(M1) ≥ ωG(E(Π))− ωH(E(Π) \M1),
and therefore




which completes the proof.
3.3.6 Bounding the weight of M2 in H.
The main result of the previous section lower bounds the weight of the edges of E(Π)\M1 in
H. In this section we use this bound to show that the weight of the matching M2 of H is at
least ωH(E(Π) \M1)/4. We do this in Lemma 3.3.8 by showing that there exist a matching
in H using only the edges in E(Π) \M1 that satisfies the desired bound.
We prove this result in two steps. Lemma 3.3.7 shows that for any matching M there
exists a subset A of k edges of E(Π) \M such that A ∪M forms a collection of paths in H,
A contains an edge from every 2-path of Π and that A has a “large enough” weight. Lemma
3.3.8 then shows that any such set of edges can be partitioned into two matchings of H, at
least one of them satisfying the desired bound.
Definition 3.3.4. For a set of edges X and a 2-path partition Π, let ΠX denote the set of
2-paths of Π that use at least one edge of X.
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Definition 3.3.5. Let X ⊆ E(G), M be matching of G, and ω be a weight function on
E(G). Then X is called ω-dominant with respect to Π and M if
ω(E(Π) ∩X) ≥ 1
2
· ω(ΠX \ ΠM) + ω(ΠX ∩ ΠM). (3.25)
Moreover, X is called strongly ω-dominant w.r.t. Π and M if every connected component of
X is ω-dominant w.r.t. Π and M .
We simply refer to a set of edges X as ω-dominant when Π and M are implicit.
Lemma 3.3.6. Let X, Y ⊆ E(G) be two ω-dominant sets w.r.t. a 2-path partition Π and a
matching M . If X ∩ Y = ∅ then X ∪ Y is ω-dominant w.r.t. Π and M .
Proof. Observe that since X and Y are disjoint
ω(E(Π) ∩ (X ∪ Y )) = ω(E(Π) ∩X) + ω(E(Π) ∩ Y )
and since both X and Y are ω-dominant it holds that
ω(E(Π) ∩ (X ∪ Y )) ≥ 1
2
· (ω(ΠX \ ΠM) + ω(ΠY \ ΠM))
+ ω(ΠX ∩ ΠM) + ω(ΠY ∩ ΠM)
≥ 1
2




· ω(ΠX∪Y \ ΠM) + ω(ΠX∪Y ∩ ΠM),
where the first inequality follows from the definition of ω-dominance applied to both X and
Y , the second inequality follows from the inclusion-exclusion principle and the equality is
direct from Definition 3.3.4.
Lemma 3.3.7. Let Π be a 2-path partition of a graph G, M be an arbitrary matching of G
and ω be a weight function on E(G). Then there exists a matching A of G such that:
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(a) |A|= k,
(b) A ⊆ (E(Π) \M),
(c) A ∪M is strongly ω-dominant w.r.t. Π and M , and
(d) A ∪M contains no cycles.
Proof. We first show that there exists matching in G which satisfies conditions (a)-(c). For
this, let A∗ be the set of edges obtained by taking all the edges of E(ΠM) \M , and the edge
with higher weight from every 2-path in Π \ ΠM . Since the 2-paths of Π are vertex disjoint
by definition, A∗ is a valid matching. The matching A∗ contains one edge from every 2-path
of Π and thus the size of A∗ is k, satisfying condition (a) of the lemma. Moreover, it is easy
to see that A∗ satisfies condition (b) of the lemma by construction.
Let X ⊆ A∗ ∪M be a connected component. Then for every π ∈ ΠX ∩ ΠM one edge of
π is in M by definition of ΠM and the other edge of π is in A
∗ ∩X by definition of A∗ and
therefore π ⊆ X. Moreover, for every π ∈ ΠX \ ΠM the edge of π with higher weight is in
X, and therefore X is ω-dominant. Thus, since any connected component X ⊆ A∗ ∪M is
ω-dominant, it holds that A∗ ∪M is strongly ω-dominant w.r.t. Π and M , and A∗ satisfies
condition (c) of the lemma.
Among all matchings of G that satisfy conditions (a)-(c), let A be such that A ∪ M
contains the fewest number of cycles and assume for contradiction that there exists a cycle
C ⊆ A ∪M . Observe that since any vertex of G is incident to at most an edge of A and
an edge of M , the set of edges A ∪M is a collection of disjoint paths and cycles of G. We
construct a new matching A′ that satisfies conditions (a)-(c) and has one less cycle, thus
reaching a contradiction.
Let ΠC and ΠM denote the set of 2-paths of Π having an edge in common with the cycle
C and the matching M respectively, like in Definition 3.3.4. We first show that these two
sets of paths are disjoint:












(c) Cycle modified to
path.
Figure 3.3: Edges of the matching M are depicted in bold (red) and 2-paths of Π in light
gray. (a) An example of a 2-path in Π containing an edge a ∈M ; the edge a can be incident
to only one other edge b ∈ M ∪ A∗ and therefore cannot be part of a cycle in M ∪ A∗. (b)
An example of a cycle C in M ∪A∗. (c) The path P ′ formed from the edges of cycle C when
edge a∗ is replaced by b∗.
Claim 1: ΠC ∩ ΠM = ∅.
Assume for contradiction that π ∈ ΠC ∩ ΠM and let π = {a, b}, with a ∈ E(Π) \M and
b ∈ M (Fig. 3.3(a)). Moreover, let γ(a) = {u, x} and γ(b) = {v, x}. Since vertex v is
incident to b, v is not incident to any other edge in M . Moreover, since v is a vertex of π, v
is not incident to any other edge in Π. Since A ⊂ E(Π) it holds that v is not incident to any
edge in A. Therefore v is the end of a path in A ∪M which implies π /∈ ΠC , contradicting
the assumption. 
The following three claims show that there are multiple ways to modify A to a matching
that satisfies conditions (a) and (b) of the lemma and forms fewer cycles with the edges of
M . Then we show that one of these modified matchings also satisfies condition (c), therefore
contradicting the fact that A is the matching with fewest cycles satisfying conditions (a)-(c).
Let π be an arbitrary 2-path in ΠC . Observe that since A is a matching of size k and
A ⊆ E(Π), A contains an edge from every 2-path of Π. Let π = {aπ, bπ} with aπ ∈ A and
bπ ∈ π \ A, and let Aπ = A ∪ {bπ} \ {aπ}.
Claim 2: Aπ is a matching of G.
Since A ⊆ E(Π) and the 2-paths of Π are vertex disjoint, edge bπ is adjacent only to edge
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aπ in A. Therefore A ∪ {bπ} \ {aπ} is a matching of G. 
Claim 3: |Aπ|= k.
The cardinality of Aπ is the same as the cardinality of A and |A|= k by definition. 
Claim 4: Aπ ⊆ (E(Π) \M).
Clearly Aπ ⊆ E(Π) since by definition A ⊆ E(Π) and bπ ∈ E(Π). Since A∩M = ∅ to prove
the claim we just need to show that bπ /∈ M . Observe that if bπ ∈ M it holds that π ∈ ΠM
and since by definition π ∈ ΠC , it holds that π ∈ ΠM ∩ ΠC which contradicts Claim 1. 
Claim 5: Aπ ∪M has one less cycle than A ∪M .
Let v be the vertex incident to bπ but not incident to aπ like in Fig. 3.3(b). Since bπ /∈ A
and A ⊆ E(Π), the vertex v is not being matched by A and therefore v has degree at most
1 in A ∪ M and thus is a path-end for some (possibly trivial) path Pπ in A ∪ M . Let
P ′π = C ∪ Pπ ∪ {bπ} \ {aπ} (Fig. 3.3(c)) and observe that P ′π is a connected component of
Aπ ∪M .
Let u be the vertex incident to aπ but not incident to bπ. Observe that u is a vertex
of P ′π and has degree 1, implying P
′
π is not a cycle. Since Aπ is a matching, all connected
components of Aπ ∪M are either paths or cycles and therefore P ′π is a path. Since all other
connected components of M ∪ Aπ are also connected components of M ∪ A, it holds that
M ∪ Aπ has one less cycle than M ∪ A. 
To prove the lemma it remains to show that there exists π∗ ∈ ΠC such that Aπ∗ satisfies
condition (c) of the lemma, i.e. that A∗ ∪M is strongly ω-dominant w.r.t. Π and M . Let
π∗ = {a∗, b∗} be a 2-path in ΠC such that
ω(aπ∗)− ω(bπ∗) ≤ ω(aπ)− ω(bπ), ∀ π ∈ ΠC . (3.26)
Claim 6: Aπ∗ is strongly ω-dominant w.r.t. Π and M .
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Let P ′π∗ = C ∪Pπ∗ ∪ {b∗π} \ {a∗π}. In the proof for Claim 5 we showed that P ′π∗ is a path and
therefore P ′π∗ is a connected component. Since all other connected components of Aπ∗ ∪M
are also connected components of A ∪M , to prove the claim it is enough to show that P ′π∗
is ω-dominant.
Let C ′ = C∪{b∗π}\{a∗π} and observe that since C ′ and Pπ∗ are disjoint, to show that P ′π∗ is
ω-dominant by Lemma 3.3.6 it is enough to show that both C ′ and Pπ∗ are ω-dominant. Since
Pπ∗ is a connected component of A ∪M which is strongly ω-dominant, Pπ∗ is ω-dominant.
It remains to show that C ′ is ω-dominant. Observe that

































ω(ΠC) + ω(aπ∗)− ω(bπ∗), (3.27)
where the first equality is by definition of aπ and the second equality is by rearranging terms.
The first inequality follows from the choice of π∗ = {aπ∗ , bπ∗} as the 2-path that minimizes
ω(aπ)−ω(bπ) over all π ∈ ΠC (Ineq. (3.26)) and the second inequality is due to the fact that
there are at least two edges of A in a cycle of A ∪M , and therefore |ΠC |≥ 2. By moving
terms, Ineq. (3.27) can be rewritten as
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Since by definition aπ∗ ∈ E(Π) ∩ C and bπ∗ /∈ E(Π) ∩ C, it holds that
ω(E(Π) ∩ C ′) = ω(E(Π) ∩ C)− ω(aπ∗) + ω(bπ∗)
and therefore Ineq. (3.28) implies
ω(E(Π) ∩ C ′) ≥ 1
2
ω(ΠC). (3.29)
Since ΠC = Π
′
C and by Claim 1 it holds that ΠC ∩ ΠM = ∅, Ineq. (3.29) is equivalent to
ω(E(Π) ∩ C ′) ≥ 1
2
ω(ΠC′ \ ΠM) + ω(ΠC′ ∩ ΠM) (3.30)
and therefore C ′ is ω-dominant, thus proving the claim. 
Putting it all together, we first showed that there exists a matching satisfying conditions
(a)-(c) of the lemma and we assumed that A is a matching of G satisfying conditions (a)-(c)
such that the number of cycles in A∪M is minimized. Assuming that there exists a cycle C
in A∪M we constructed a set of edges Aπ∗ that is a matching by Claim 2, satisfies conditions
(a) by Claim 3, (b) by Claim 4 and (c) by Claim 6, and for which Aπ∗ ∪M has one less cycle
than A ∪M (Claim 5), thus reaching a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section which lower bounds the weight
of the matching M2 in graph H. To do so we show that there exists a matching of H
satisfying the desired bound and uses only edges of Π.
Lemma 3.3.8. Let Π and M be a 2-path partition and a matching of a simple complete graph
G respectively. If H = G/M then there exists a matching A∗ of H with A∗ ⊆ E(Π) \M ,
|A∗|= k/2 and ωH(A∗) ≥ ωH(E(Π) \M)/4.
Proof. Let ω be an edge weight function on E(G) with ω(e) = 0 for any e ∈ M and
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ω(e) = ωH(e) for any edge e ∈ E(G) \M . Let A ⊆ E(Π) \M be a matching of size k such
that A ∪M is ω-dominant w.r.t. Π and M and A ∪M is a collection of disjoint paths, as
guaranteed to exist by Lemma 3.3.7.
Since A is a matching in G and A ⊆ E(Π), every 2-path of Π has an edge in A and
therefore ΠA = Π, thus also implying ΠA∪M = Π. Then, from the ω-dominance of A ∪M it
holds that
ω(E(Π) ∩ (A ∪M)) ≥ 1
2
· ω(Π \ ΠM) + ω(Π ∩ ΠM). (3.31)
Since A and M are disjoint, Ineq. (3.31) implies
ω(E(Π) ∩ A) + ω(E(Π) ∩M)) ≥ 1
2
· ω(Π \ ΠM) + ω(ΠM),
and therefore
ω(E(Π) ∩ A) ≥ 1
2












where the first equality is direct from the definition of ΠM as the set of 2-paths of Π inter-
secting M .
Since A∪M forms a collection of disjoint paths in G, the edges of A also form a collection
of disjoint paths in H = G/M . We partition these edges into two matchings A1 and A2 of
H, each with k/2 edges. One of those matchings has at least half the weight of A, thus
proving the lemma.
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3.3.7 Graphs with odd number of vertices.
Remember that since the WeightedDoubleMatching algorithm presented in Fig. 3.1
assumes a perfect matching exists for the input graph, it must take as input a graph of size
3k for some even k. In this section we show how to modify the algorithm to deal with graphs
of odd size. The high level idea is to modify the input graph by adding three additional
dummy vertices that are incident only to edges of weight 0 and to choose matchings M1
and M2 with some additional properties in such a way that the resulting 2-path partition
has a 2-path containing the three dummy vertices. By discarding this 2-path the algorithm
outputs a partition of the original graph. The challenge is to show that the new properties
enforced on the matchings M1 and M2 don’t have a significant effect on the weight of the
resulting 2-path partition.
Let G′ be the graph formed from G by adding three dummy vertices d1, d2 and d3 incident
only to edges of weight 0. Let e1 be the edge of G
′ with endpoints d1 and d2 and let e2 be the
edge of G′ with endpoints d2 and d3. Let OPT be a fixed optimal 2-path partition of G and
let πd be the 2-path {e1, e2}. Moreover, let Π = OPT ∪{πd} be a 2-path partition of G′, not
necessarily optimal. Clearly, the weight of OPT in G equals the weight of Π in G′. We run
the WeightedDoubleMatching algorithm on graph G′ with some minor modifications,
as explained below.
We modify Step 1 of the algorithm to choose a maximum weight perfect matching M1
with the property that e1 ∈ M1. It is easy to see that such a perfect maximum weight
matching of G′ exists and can be computed efficiently.
Let e3 be the edge of M1 matching vertex d3 and let ve1 and ve3 be the vertices of
H ≡ G′/M1 corresponding to edges e1 and e3 of G′ respectively. We modify Step 4 of the
WeightedDoubleMatching algorithm to set M2 to a matching of maximum weight in
H among those matchings M having the following properties:
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• |M |= (k + 1)/2, and
• M matches vertex ve1 to vertex ve3 or M does not match ve1 .
Such a matching can be computed efficiently by removing all edges incident to ve1 in H,
except for edge e2.
Observe that M2 is may not be a maximum weight matching of size (k + 1)/2 in
H. However, Lemma 3.3.8 guarantees that there exists a matching of weight ωH(A
∗) ≥
ωH(E(Π) \M1)/4 using only edges of Π. Since e2 is the only edge of Π incident to ve1 in H
it holds that
ωH(M2) ≥ ωH(E(Π) \M1)/4. (3.32)
Next, we modify Step 6 of the algorithm to guarantee that edge e1 is part of a 2-path
in the output of the algorithm. If ve1 is not matched by M2 then the original algorithm
already guarantees that since ve1 ∈ Q and therefore e1 belongs to a 2-path in A2. Otherwise,
matching M2 matches ve1 to ve3 . Since by definition both e1 and e3 have weight 0 in G
′, by
breaking ties appropriately we can insure that πd, the 2-path formed by the three dummy
vertices, is a path in A1.
Observe that the modifications to Step 1 and Step 6 of the algorithm only specify how to
break ties and therefore do not alter the properties of the algorithm. The change in Step 4
may result in a suboptimal choice for M2 but as explained above, Ineq. 3.32 lower bounding
the weight of M2 in H still holds. Therefore, after these modifications of the algorithm A is a
2-path partition of G′ of weight at least 3/4 ·ωG(Π). Moreover, vertices d1 and d2 belonging
to some 2-path π1,2 ∈ A.
Let u3 ∈ V (G′) be the vertex in V (π1,2)\{d1, d2} and let π3 be the 2-path of A containing
vertex d3, with u1, u2 ∈ V (π3) \ {d3}. Finally, let πu be the 2-path of maximum weight
formed from vertices {u1, u2, u3} and output A′ = A ∪ {πu} \ {π1,2, π3}. Clearly A′ is a
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2-path partition of G and since all edges incident to the dummy vertices have weight 0 it
holds that ωG(A′) = ωG′(A), thus proving Theorem 1 for odd values of k.
3.4 M2PP on {0, 1}-edge-weighted Graphs
In this section we describe and analyze the DoubleMatching approximation algorithm
for the Maximum Weight 2-Path Partition problem (M2PP) in graphs in which the weights
of the edges are either 0 or 1. The main difference to the algorithm described in Section 3.3
is that the first matching M1 only uses edges of weight 1 and may not be perfect. In the
graph H resulting from contracting the edges of M1 we call the vertices corresponding to
edges of M1 new vertices, and the vertices from the original graph old vertices. The second
matching M2 aims to match as many old vertices with new vertices as possible, and have just
as many new-new edges as not matched new vertices. A formal description of the algorithm
is presented in Fig. 3.4.
3.4.1 Examples.
Fig. 3.5 illustrates an example for the case where the matching M1 has at most k edges. Fig.
3.5(a) shows a complete {0, 1}-edge-weighted graph on 12 vertices (k = 4) and matching
number 3, with its zero weight edges omitted. A maximum weight matching, M1 = {a, b, c},
is shown in bold (red). Fig. 3.5(b) shows the graph H obtained from contracting the edges
of M1, with the matching M2 shown in bold (red). Vertices va, vb and vc correspond to the
edges a, b and c respectively. Fig. 3.5 (c) shows the resulting 2-paths with zero weight edges
drawn as dotted segments. The algorithm outputs the sets A1 = {π1, π′1, π′′1} and A4 = {π4}.
Note that when G has a small matching number (≤ k), both A2 and A3 are empty since all
new vertices are matched by M2 to old vertices.
Fig. 3.6(a) shows a complete {0, 1}-edge-weighted graph G on 12 vertices with its zero
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Input: complete {0, 1}-edge-weighted graph G = (V,E, ωG, γG).
1. M1 ← maximum weight matching of G with no weight 0 edges
2. H ← G/M1; let Vold = V (H) ∩ V (G) and Vnew = V (H) \ V (G).
We call an edge e ∈ E(H):
• a new-new edge if γ(e) ⊆ Vnew,
• an old-old edge if γ(e) ⊆ Vold,
• an old-new edge otherwise.
3. M2 ← maximum weight matching of H (based on ωH) satisfying the following con-
straints:
a. M2 has min{|Vnew|, |Vold|} old-new edges.
b. if |Vnew|> |Vold|, then M2 has (|Vnew|−|Vold|)/3 new-new edges.
c. M2 doesn’t have any old-old edges.
4. Call any old vertex not matched by M2 a residual vertex and denote by R the set of
residual vertices in H.
5. Create four sets of 2-paths A1, ...,A4 as follows:
• A1: one 2-path for each old-new edge e ∈M2. Let va be the new endpoint of e in
H and let a ∈ E(G) be the edge corresponding to va. Create a 2-path from edges
a and e.
• A2: one 2-path for each new-new edge e ∈M2. Let va and vb be the endpoints of
e in H and let a, b ∈ E(G) be the edges corresponding to va and vb respectively.
Assume that ωG(a) ≥ ωG(b). Create a 2-path from edges a and e and add the
unused vertex of b to the residual vertex set R.
• A3: one 2-path for each new vertex va of H not matched by M2. Let a ∈ E(G) be
the edge corresponding to va. Create a 2-path from the edge a and an arbitrary
residual vertex in R.
• A4: create 2-paths arbitrarily from the unused residual vertices of R.
Return: A ← A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3 ∪ A4.
Figure 3.4: The DoubleMatching algorithm for {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs
































Figure 3.6: DoubleMatching on a graph with large matching number.
weight edges omitted. A maximum matching M1 = {a, b, c, d, e} is shown in bold (red).
Fig. 3.6(b) shows the graph H obtained from G after the edges of M1 are contracted. The
vertices va-ve correspond to edges a-e respectively. The matching M2 is shown in bold (red).
Fig. 3.6(c) shows the resulting 2-paths with zero weight edges drawn as dotted segments.
The algorithm produces the sets A1 = {π1, π′1}, A2 = {π2} and A3 = {π3}. Note that
when G has a large matching number (≥ k), the set A4 is empty because all old vertices are
matched in M2 and the number of new-new edges in M2 equals the number of new vertices
not matched my M2 and therefore all residual vertices are used in A3.
3.4.2 Algorithm Analysis.
The main result of this section is the following theorem which is a corollary of Proposition
3.4.6 and Proposition 3.4.10.
Theorem 3.1.2. DoubleMatching is a 3/4-approximation algorithm for the M2PP on
{0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs and runs in time O(n2.5).
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To intuitively understand why the DoubleMatching algorithm performs better than
WeightedDoubleMatching, consider it’s different characteristics depending on whether
|Vnew| is larger than |Vold| or not (or equivalently, on whether matching M1 is larger than k
or not). When the size of M1 is smaller than k, it holds that |Vold| is smaller than |Vnew|,
and thus all of the edges of the matching M1 are used in the output solution. This contrasts
with WeightedDoubleMatching where only 2/3 of the edges of M1 are used in the final
2-path partition. Conversely, when M1 is larger than k, we can assert that ω(M1) is up to
3/4 of the weight of the optimal solution. This contrasts to the weighted case where ω(M1)
may be only half the weight of the optimal solution.
For the rest of this section let Π be the set of 2-paths of a fixed solution. Moreover, the
following notations are used throughout the remainder of this section.
Definition 3.4.1. We use the following notations:
• Z: the number of edges of weight 0 used by Π;
• O1 ⊆ Vold: the set of old vertices incident to at least one edge of Π of weight 1;
• O0 = Vold \ O1.
We begin our analysis with a few simple claims that are being used in the later sections.
The first observation formalizes the intuition that the smaller the size of the matching M1,
the fewer of its edges we have to break in Step 5 of the algorithm. The second observation
emphasizes the fact that no value is lost from not matching old vertices to each other. Finally,
the lemma shows that only a limited number of edges of weight 1 exist between old and new
vertices. When combined, the three claims can be used to argue that the weight of the
algorithm solution is relatively large even when the cardinality of the first matching is small.
Observation 3.4.1. |Vold|= 3k − 2|M1|.
Observation 3.4.2. ω(e) = 0, for any old-old edge e ∈ E(H).











Figure 3.7: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 3.4.3. (a) The new vertex ve in H having 3
new neighbors connected to by edges of weight 1 in E(Π). (b) The edge e with endpoints
{a, b} in the matching M1, the 2-paths of OPT using vertices x, y and z in light gray, and
the alternating path (x, a, b, y) in G.
Lemma 3.4.3. Every new vertex has at most two incident old-new edges of weight 1 in
E(Π).
Proof. Assume that a new vertex ve ∈ Vnew has three incident old-new edges of weight 1
in E(Π). Let γ(e) = {a, b} and let x, y, z ∈ E(Π) be the three old-new edges of weight 1
incident to ve. Observe that, since all the edges belong to the 2-partition Π, at most two of
the three edges are incident to either a or b in G as shown in Fig. 3.7. W.l.o.g., let x be
incident to a and let y be incident to b. Remember that by definition an old-new edge is
incident to exactly one old vertex and one new vertex and therefore only one of its endpoints
in G is matched by M1. Therefore, the set of edges M1 ∪ {x, y} \ {e} is a matching in G of
larger weight, contradicting the maximality of M1.
Lemma 3.4.4. Z ≥ 2
3
|O0|.
Proof. As O0 ⊆ V (G), each of its vertices is covered by a 2-path of Π. For j = 1, 2, 3,
let `j denote the number of 2-paths in Π containing exactly j vertices of O0. Note that
|O0|= 3`3 + 2`2 + `1.
Let π be a 2-path of Π. If π contains one vertex of O0, then π contains at least an edge
of weight 0 by definition of O0. Moreover, if two or three vertices of π are in O0, then both
edges of π have weight 0. By summing the number of edges of weight 0 over all 2-paths in
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3.4.3 Small matching number.
In this section we show that the algorithm provides a good approximation when the matching
number of the graph is less than k. The following lemma bounds the weight of the second
matching M2 in this case.
Lemma 3.4.5. If |M1|≤ k, then ω(M2) ≥ |O1|/2.
Proof. To prove the lemma we show that there exist a matching of weight at least |O1|/2 in
a restricted subgraph of H. Let HΠ be the subgraph of H using only the old-new edges of
Π of weight 1. Observe that HΠ is a bipartite graph and let X be a matching of maximum
weight in HΠ.
Assume for contradiction that ω(X) < |O1|/2. Let NX be the set of new vertices matched
by X and let OX be the neighborhood of NX in the graph HΠ. We first show that for any
v ∈ O1 \OX there exist an edge e ∈ E(HΠ) incident to v such that {e}∪X is a matching of
HΠ of higher weight than X. To see this, we first show that an there exists an edge incident
to v in HΠ and then show that any such edge is not incident to any other edge of X.
By definition of O1 (Def. 3.4.1), for any vertex v ∈ O1 there exists an edge e ∈ E(Π)
incident to v such that ω(e) = 1. Since by Obs. 3.4.2 all old-old edges of H have weight
zero, e is an old-new edge of H and therefore e ∈ E(HΠ). To see that such an edge e is not
incident to any other edges of X remember that by definition of OX it holds that v is not in
the neighborhood of NX .
It remains to show that the set O1 \ OX is not empty. To see this observe that since
by assumption ω(X) < |O1|/2, it also holds that |NX |< |O1|/2. Moreover, since by Lemma
3.4.3 a new vertex can be incident to at most 2 old-new edges of weight 1 in H, it holds that
|WX |< |O1|. Therefore, |O1|< |OX | implying that O1\OX is not empty and thus completing
the proof.
Using the above lemma we are ready to prove the approximation guarantee for graphs
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with small matching number.
Proposition 3.4.6. When |M1|≤ k the DoubleMatching algorithm is a 7/12-approximation
for the M2PP problem in {0, 1}-graphs.
Proof. Observe that since the size of M1 is smaller than k, the number of old vertices is
larger than the number of new vertices in H and therefore M2 has exactly |Vnew| old-new
edges and therefore, M2 matches all the new vertices with old vertices. Thus, the sets of
2-paths A2 and A3 are empty since every element of these sets corresponds to a new-new
edge of M2 or an edge not matched by M2 respectively.
The weight of A1 equals the sum of the weights of the edges of the matching M1 and the
weights of the matching M2 and therefore the lemma follows:
















The second inequality follows from Lemma 3.4.5; the first equality follows from Obs. 3.4.1
(stating that 2|M1|+|Vold|= 3k) and the fact that |O0|+|O1|= |Vold| sinceO0 andO1 partition
Vold; the third inequality follows from Lemma 3.4.4 (stating that Z ≥ 23 |O0|); and the last
equality follows from the definition of Z (denoting the number of zero weight edges in Π).
3.4.4 Large matching number.
The case where the original graph has a matching number larger than or equal to k is more
involved. In this case the number of old vertices is less than the number of new vertices
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and the second matching has exactly Vold old-new edges. Lemma 3.4.7 below shows that
satisfying part of constraint on M2 is not detrimental to its weight. As before, we only
consider matchings of H whose edges are in E(Π).
Lemma 3.4.7. If |M1|> k then for any matching X of H with X ⊆ E(Π) and ω(e) = 1 for
all e ∈ X, there exists a matching X∗ of H such that:
(1) X∗ contains at least |O1|/2 old-new edges
(2) X∗ ⊆ E(Π), and
(3) ω(X∗) = ω(X).
Proof. Observe that X satisfies conditions (2) and (3) of the lemma and let X∗ be a matching
of H with the largest number of old-new edges among those matchings of H for which
conditions (2) and (3) of the lemma hold. Assume for contradiction that condition (1) is
violated, namely, X∗ contains α < |O1|/2 old-new edges and contains at least one new-new
edge.
Let NX∗ , |NX∗|= α, be the set of new vertices that are endpoints of an old-new edge in
X∗. Let OX∗ be the set of old vertices that are connected to a vertex in the set NX∗ by an
edge of weight 1 in E(Π):
OX∗ = {v ∈ Vold : ∃e ∈ E(Π) s.t. v ∈ γ(e), ω(e) = 1, γ(e) ∩NX∗ 6= ∅}.
Since by Lemma 3.4.3 a new vertex cannot be incident to more than 2 old-new edges of
weight 1 in E(Π) it follows that |OX∗|≤ 2|NX∗|= 2α < |O1| and therefore O1 \ OX∗ is not
empty.
Let u be an old vertex in O1 \ OX∗ and e ∈ E(Π) be an old-new edge of weight 1 such
that u ∈ γ(e). Observe that such an edge exists since u is a vertex in O1 and moreover
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observe that e is not incident to an old-new edge of X∗ since otherwise u would be a vertex
in OX∗ .
If e is incident to some new-new edge of X∗, let e′ be that edge; otherwise let e′ be an
arbitrary new-new edge of X∗. The set X∗∪{e}\{e′} is a matching satisfying conditions (2)
and (4) of the lemma and having more old-new edges than X∗, and therefore contradicting
the choice of X∗.
The following lemma is the equivalent of Lemma 3.3.8 in the weighted case.
Lemma 3.4.8. The graph H = G/M1 has a matching A
∗ ⊆ E(Π) with weight (k − Z)/2.
Proof. Let A ⊆ E(Π) be a matching of G, with |A|= k, such that A ∪M1 is a collection
of paths. Remember that Lemma 3.3.7 in Section 3.3.6 shows that such a matching exists.
Because A ⊆ E(Π) and Π has exactly Z edges of weight 0, it holds that ω(A) ≥ k − Z.
Moreover, since A ∪M1 is a collection of paths in G, it holds that A is a collection of paths
in the graph H. By partitioning the edges of A into two matchings A1 and A2 of H, we
obtain at least one matching with at least half the weight of A, thus proving the lemma.
The following lemma bounds the weight of the second matching M2 in the case when the
size of the first matching is large. The idea is to start from a matching of weight (k − Z)/2
as guaranteed to exist by Lemma 3.4.8 and transform it into a matching of the same weight
that uses some old-new edges by using Lemma 3.4.7. Then, we show that the resulting
matching can be completed to a matching with |Vold| number of old-new edges.
Lemma 3.4.9. If |M1|> k, then ω(M2) ≥ (2k − 3Z)/4.
Proof. Let A ⊆ E(Π) be a matching of H with ω(A) ≥ (k − Z)/2 as guaranteed to exist by
Lemma 3.4.8. Let X be a set of (2k − 3Z)/4 edges of weight 1 from A. Then, by Lemma
3.4.7, there exist a matching X∗ of cardinality and weight equal to (2k − 3Z)/4 that either
has at least |O1|/2 old-new edges, or has no new-new edges.
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We show that X∗ can be completed to a matching of H that satisfies the requirements
of the algorithm, namely a matching that has exactly |Vold| old-new edges (step 3.a. of the
algorithm) and contains exactly (|Vnew|−|Vold|)/3 new-new edges (step 3.b. of the algorithm).
For this it is enough to show that X∗ does not have too many edges of any type.
Since X∗ has only edges of weight 1 and all old-old edges have weight 0, no old-old edges
are in X∗. Moreover, observe that no matching can have more than |Vold| old-new edges.
Therefore, to complete the proof it is enough to show that X∗ has at most (|Vnew|−|Vold|)/3
new-new edges. Since the number of old-new edges in X∗ is at least |O1|/2, we prove this
by bounding the size of the set X∗:

















The first equality follows from the definition of X∗, the second equality follows by rearranging
terms, the first inequality is due to the fact that |Vold|= 3k − 2|M1| and that according to
Lemma 3.4.4 it holds that Z ≥ 2
3
|O0|; the last equality follows from the fact that O0 and O1
partition Vold.
Since X∗ has at least |O1|/2 old-new edges by definition, Ineq. (3.33) implies that
|X∗| has at most |M1|−k new-new edges and therefore it remains to show that |M1|−k ≤




|M1|−(3k − 2 · |M1|)
3
= |M1|−k,
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where the first equality is due to the fact that |Vnew|= |M1| from the definition of Vnew and
the fact that |Vold|= 3k − 2 · |M1| by Obs. 3.4.1. Thus we proved that X∗ does not have
more than (|Vnew|−|Vold|)/3 new-new edges.
Since X∗ has weight (2k−3Z)/4 and does not have too many edges of any type, arbitrary
edges of each type can be added to complete X∗ to a matching of H of weight at least
(2k − 3Z)/4 satisfying conditions 3.a and 3.b of the DoubleMatching algorithm, namely
a matching that has exactly |Vold| old-new edges and exactly (|Vnew|−|Vold|)/3 new-new edges,
thus completing the proof.
Proposition 3.4.10. When |M1|> k the DoubleMatching algorithm is a 7/12-approximation
for the M2PP problem in {0, 1}-graphs.
Proof. Recall that ω(Π) = 2k − Z. Since by construction M2 has (|Vnew|−|Vold|)/3 many








where the second equality holds by the fact that |M1|= |Vnew| and Obs 3.4.1.
The solution A provided by the algorithm satisfies
ω(A) ≥ ω(M1) + ω(M2)− (|M1|−k)
since the solution uses all the edges of M2 and all but |A2|= |M1|−k edges of M1 (as one
edge of M1 is unused for every new-new edge of M2). By definition ω(M1) = |M1|, and







(2k − Z) = 3
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ω(Π).














Figure 3.8: The analysis of the DoubleMatching approximation ratio is tight
where Lemma 3.4.9,
3.4.5 Tightness of the analysis.
We illustrate in Fig. 3.8 an example for which our analysis is tight. Fig. 3.8(a) depicts a
complete graph on nine vertices (k = 3), omitting the zero-weight edges. The 2-paths of the
optimal solution are shown in light gray, with a total weight of 4 (two 2-paths of weight 2
and one 2-path of weight 0). The edges of the first matching M1 of size k = 3 are shown
in bold (red). Fig. 3.8(b) depicts the graph H obtained after contracting the edges of M1
in G. The new vertices resulting from contracting the edges of M1 are depicted in white
and the second matching M2 of zero weight is depicted with dotted edges. Remember that
the algorithm requires the number of old-new edges in the matching M2 to be equal to 3,
the number of old vertices in H. Fig. 3.8(c) shows the final 2-partition of the algorithm
resulting from the union of the edges of the two matchings. It’s weight is 3 showing that the
DoubleMatching does not guarantee a better than 3/4 approximation.
3.4.6 Time Complexity
The following lemma shows that the matching M2 in H satisfying the three properties
specified in step 3 of the DoubleMatching algorithm can be computed efficiently.
Lemma 3.4.11. Let H = (Vold ∪ Vnew, E, ω) be a complete {0, 1}-edge-weighted graph with
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|Vold|+2|Vnew|= 3k for some integer k. There exists a O(k2.5) time algorithm that computes
the maximum weight matching M of H among those matchings having:
a. min{|Vnew|, |Vold|} old-new edges.
b. max{0, (|Vnew|−|Vold|)/3} new-new edges.
c. no old-old edges.
Proof. If |Vnew|≤ |Vold|, then it is enough to find the maximum weight matching of size |Vnew|
in the bipartite graph composed of the old-new edges of H.
If |Vnew|> |Vold|, it is sufficient to find the maximum weight matching of size 2k − |Vnew|
in a new graph H̃ obtained from H by changing the weights of the edges as follows:
• for every pair of two old vertices u, v ∈ Vold set ω({u, v}) = −∞.
• for every old-new edge e, increase the original weight ω(e) by a constant T ≥ 3k.
Clearly, a maximum weight matching in H̃ will not contain any edges between two old
vertices. Moreover, every matching having |Vold| many old-new edges has larger weight
than a matching with fewer old-new edges. Therefore, every maximum weight matching
in H̃ will have |Vold| old-new edges and since the size of the matching is restricted to
|Vold|+(|Vnew|−|Vold|)/3, the number of new-new edges equals (|Vnew|−|Vold|)/3.
Every matching in H̃ with no old-old edges and |Vold| many old-new edges has weight
exactly T · |Vold| more than its weight in H. Therefore, a maximum weight matching in
H̃ corresponds to (has the same edges as) a maximum weight matching in H satisfying
properties (a)-(c) of the lemma.
In [29] an O(k2.5) time algorithm for finding the maximum weight matching is presented
and can be easily adapted to find a maximum weight matching of a specific size. To find a
maximum weight matching of fixed size s, one can add to the graph n−2s dummy nodes that
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are connected to all the nodes of the original graph by edges of large weight C and calculate
the maximum weight matching on the new graph. The s edges with both endpoints among
the vertices of the original graph form a maximum weight matching of cardinality s.
3.5 MTP on {0, 1}-edge-weighted Graphs
In this section we direct our attention to the Maximum Triangle Partitioning (MTP)
problem on {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs and show how an approximation algorithm for the
M2PP problem can be used in combination with a .5-approximation algorithm for the Tri-
angle Packing problem to obtain an approximation algorithm for the MTP problem on
{0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs.
Our algorithm relies on the existence of an α-approximation algorithm for the M2PP
problem on complete {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs, with α ≥ .5 (e.g., our .75-approximation
algorithm from the previous section). Moreover, the algorithm relies on the existence of a
.5-approximation algorithm for the Triangle Packing problem. Interestingly, an algo-
rithm with a better approximation ratio for the Triangle Packing problem does not help
improve the approximation ratio guarantee of our algorithm for the MTP problem. Since
the 3-Set Packing problem is more general than the Triangle Packing problem, the
depth 2 local search algorithm of Halldórsson [34] paraphrased below can be used for this
step.
Theorem 3.5.1 (Theorem 3.4 of [34]). 2-locally optimal solutions for the 3-Set Packing
problem attain a .5 performance ratio.
Informally, the TriPart algorithm (Fig. 3.9) computes two triangle partitions starting
from both a 2-path partition and a triangle packing, and choses the triangle partition with
higher weight. A 2-path partition can be completed to a triangle partition of at least equal
weight by adding the missing edge to each individual 2-path. To complete a triangle packing
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Input - G: complete {0, 1}-edge-weighted graph; 2PP: 2-path partition of G.
1. Let G1 = (V,E1) be the unweighted graph
formed by taking E1 = {e ∈ E | ω(e) = 1}.
2. Find a maximal triangle packing T in G1 such that |T | is at least half of the maximum
triangle packing in G1.
3. Let GT = (VT , ET , ω) be the subgraph of G, induced by the vertices of V \ V (T ).
4. Find a maximum weight matching M of size |VT |/3 in GT .
5. Complete M to a triangle partitioning T ′ in GT by arbitrarily matching each edge
{u, v} in M to an unmatched vertex w in VT and creating a triangle {u, v, w}.
6. Let A1 = T ∪ T ′.
7. Let A2 be the collection of triangles obtained by adding the missing edge to each 2-path
of 2PP.
8. Return A, the solution of larger weight among A1 and A2.
Figure 3.9: The TriPart algorithm.
to a triangle partition the algorithm first removes the vertices of the triangles in the packing
from the original graph and then finds a maximum weight matching that matches exactly
2/3 of the remaining vertices. Finally, the edges of the matching are paired with unmatched
vertices to create additional triangles.
3.5.1 Algorithm analysis overview.
Let G = (V,E, γ, ω) be a complete {0, 1}-edge-weighted graph. The following notation is
used throughout this section:
• OPT - a fixed optimal solution for MTP on G;
• A - the set of triangles of OPT of weight 3; a = |A|;
• B - the set of triangles of OPT of weight 2; b = |B|;
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• C - the set of triangles of OPT of weight 1; c = |C|.
By the definition of a, b and c, clearly ω(OPT ) = 3a + 2b + c. Lemma 3.5.2 shows that
the weight of the triangle partition A1 is at least 2a+b+c while Lemma 3.5.3 shows that the
weight of the triangle partition A2 is at least α(2a + 2b + c). In Proposition 3.5.4 we show
that A1 has a better guaranteed approximation when OPT has mostly triangles of weight 3
and 1, and A2 has a better guaranteed approximation otherwise.
3.5.2 Bounding individual triangle partitions.
In this section we lower bound the weight of the individual algorithms A1 and A2 used in the
TriPart algorithm. Observe that algorithm A1 performs better when the optimal solution
contains mostly triangles of weight three, while algorithm A2 performs well when most of
the weight of the optimal solution comes from triangles of weight one or two. In the next
section we show how to combine these two results to obtain a lower bound for the TriPart
algorithm.
Lemma 3.5.2. ω(A1) ≥ 2a+ b+ c.
Proof. We use V (T ) to denote the set of vertices of the triangles in T , and for every triangle
t we use V (t) to denote the set of 3 vertices of G used by the triangle t.
Claim: There exists a matching in GT of size |VT |/3 of weight at least 2a+ b+ c− 3|T |.
Let X ⊆ V (T ), |X|= a, be a set of vertices such that X contains exactly one vertex of each
weight 3 triangle of OPT , i.e., for every triangle t ∈ A, |V (t) ∩ X|= 1. Observe that the
maximality of the triangle packing T ensures such a set exists, since otherwise there exists
a triangle t ∈ A such that V (T ) ∩ V (t) = ∅ and therefore t could be added to T to form a
larger triangle packing.
Let GX = G[V \ X] be the {0, 1}-edge-weighted graph obtained from G by removing
all vertices in X. Observe that GX has one edge of weight 1 from each triangle in A, and
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contains all the edges of the triangles in B and C. Therefore we can create a matching MX
of GX by choosing an edge e ∈ E(GX), ω(e) = 1, from each of the triangles in A, B and C.
Clearly, |MX |= ω(MX) = a+ b+ c.
Since MX is a matching in GX it uses at most |V (T ) \X| vertices from V (T ) and since
X ⊆ V (T ) by definition, |V (T ) \ X|= |V (T )|−|X| . Moreover, since every vertex belongs
to at most one edge of MX , there are at most |V (T )|−|X| edges of MX using vertices from
V (T ). Let MT be the set of edges of MX not using vertices from V (T ). Then MT is a
matching in GT , and ω(MT ) = |MT |= |MX |−|V (T ) \X|≥ a + b + c− (|V (T )|−|X|). Since
|X|= a and |V (T )|= 3|T |, ω(MT ) ≥ 2a+ b+ c− 3|T |.
It remains to show that 2a+b+c−3|T |≤ |VT |/3. To see this, observe that |V |= 3(a+b+c).
Thus, |VT |= 3(a + b + c − |T |). Since the cardinality of the triangle packing T is at least
half of the cardinality of the maximum triangle packing in G1 and since OPT packs exactly
a triangles in G1 by definition of a, it holds that 2|T |≥ a. Therefore 2a + b + c − 3|T |≤
a+ b+ c− |T |= |VT |/3 thus completing the proof of the claim. 
Clearly, ω(A1) ≥ ω(T ) + ω(M1) and therefore, by the claim above it holds that
ω(A1) ≥ 3|T |+2a+ b+ c− 3|T |= 2a+ b+ c,
thus proving the lemma.
Observe that the bound on ω(A1) cannot be improved by simply using a better approx-
imation algorithm for the Triangle Packing problem. The .5-approximation guarantee
is used in Lemma 3.5.2 only to ensure that the size of the constructed matching is at most
|VT |/3, as required by the step 4 of the algorithm.
Lemma 3.5.3. ω(A2) ≥ α(2a+ 2b+ c).
Proof. A 2-path partition of weight 2a+ 2b+ c can be constructed from the optimal triangle
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partition OPT : create a 2-path of weight 2 from each of the triangles in A and B, and a
2-path of weight 1 from the triangles in C. Since A2 is an α-approximation to the M2PP
problem, the lemma follows.
3.5.3 Bounding the algorithm solution.
In this section we show that taking best triangle partition among A1 and A2 results in a
solution with better approximation guarantee.




Proof. We consider two cases independently and we use Lemma 3.5.2 or Lemma 3.5.3 ac-






By Lemma 3.5.2, ω(A1) ≥ 2a+ b+ c and therefore
(2α + 1) · ω(A1) ≥ (4α + 2)a+ (2α + 1)b+ (2α + 1)c
= 2α · ω(OPT ) + 2(1− α)a+ (1− 2α)b+ c︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
. (3.35)
It remains to show that the term denoted by ∆ in Eq. 3.35 is positive:
∆ = 2a · (1− α)− (2α− 1) · b+ c
≥ 2a · (1− α)− (2α− 1) · (1− α)(2a+ c)
2α− 1
+ c
= cα ≥ 0 , (3.36)
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where the first inequality follows from the fact that α ≥ .5 and Ineq. (3.34). Therefore, from
Eqs. (3.35) and (3.36) it holds that
ω(OPT ) ≤ 2α + 1
2α
· ω(A2), (3.37)
thus proving the lemma for Case 1.
Case 2:
b ≥ (1− α)(2a+ c)
(2α− 1)
.






















where the second inequality is due to the fact that 1 ≥ α ≥ .5, and therefore the coefficient
of c in the second term is positive. Remember that by Lemma 3.5.3 it holds that ω(A2) ≥







= 2aα + a+ 2bα + b+ cα + c/2
≥ 2a+ 2b+ c+ (a+ b)(2α− 1)
≥ 3a+ 2b+ c, (3.39)
where the second inequality is due to the fact that α ≥ .5 and the third inequality is due to
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Ineq. (3.38). Since by definition ω(OPT ) = 3a+ 2b+ c, Eq. (3.39) implies that
ω(OPT ) ≤ 2α + 1
2α
· ω(A2), (3.40)
thus proving the lemma for Case 2.
Taking the output of the DoubleMatching algorithm as the 2-path partition solution
in the TriPart algorithm guarantees α ≥ 3/4 and therefore Proposition 3.5.4 yields the
following theorem as a corollary.
Theorem 3.1.3. TriPart is a 5/8-approximation algorithm for the MTP problem on {0, 1}-
edge-weighted graphs and runs in time O(n2.5).
3.6 Conclusions
We presented two matching based algorithms that significantly improve the approximation
factor for the M2PP problem, providing a 7/12-approximation algorithm for graphs with
general non-negative weights and a 3/4-approximation algorithm for {0, 1}-edge-weighted
graphs. Moreover, we showed that any approximation algorithm for M2PP in {0, 1}-edge-
weighted graphs can be transformed into a MTP approximation algorithm and in particular
that the DoubleMatching algorithm for M2PP can be used to obtain a 5/8-approximation
algorithm for MTP in {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs.
Although in this work we significantly improved the approximation ratio for the M2PP
problem in both general and {0, 1}-edge-weighted graphs, a large gap between our approx-
imation guarantees and the best known lower bounds still exists. Moreover, even though
the improved approximation guarantee for the the M2PP problem in {0, 1}-edge-weighted
graphs translates into a better approximation for the MTP problem in those same graphs, the
better approximation for the M2PP problem in graphs with non-negative weights does not
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Efficiently allocating resources among multiple potential recipients is just as relevant a prob-
lem in microeconomics as in computer science. In this chapter, based on work published in
the conference on Web and Internet Economics [52], we analyze the team formation prob-
lem from a game theoretic perspective where the goal of each team is to acquire as many
resources (workers) as possible, while the goal of the organization at large is to allocate the
workers in a way that maximizes the social welfare, i.e. the total efficacy of all the teams.
In the mechanism design literature it is customary to use the power of currency exchange
to provide incentives for the players to be truthful. However, it has been pointed out that
assuming the existence of currency in the model is not always justified ([53]). In the present
work we initiate the study of mechanisms with verification, first introduced by Nisan and
Ronen in [54] for the job scheduling problem, for resource allocation problems in a setting
without currency. This reveals an unexplored middle ground area between the settings of the
multiple choice knapsack problem and that of multi-item auctions, which has some obvious
practical applications.
76
CHAPTER 4. TEAM SIZE 77
The knapsack problem and its variations model the setting where the supplier knows
precisely what value the players are getting from any number of items. This can be thought
of as a perfect verification mechanism, and selfishness does not play a role. At the other
extreme, work in algorithmic game theory has generally considered the case where the sup-
plier knows nothing about the agents’ valuation and must provide incentives, typically by
imposing payments, for the players to be truthful.
In this work we analyze the Funding Game, in which the supplier is a corporation that
desires to improve its efficiency by hiring m additional employees and distributing them
among n teams, each of whom can improve its productivity with each new team member.
In this chapter we assume that the new employees are identical, so that only the number
of new team members is relevant to each team’s increased productivity. The productivity
increase for each team is a private valuation function known only to the team’s manager,
and not known directly to the upper management.
We assume a simplified worker allocation process in which each team manager requests a
number of new employees xi, and specifies its value (expected increase in productivity) ṽi(xi)
for these workers, which might be less, but not more, that its real value vi(xi). The upper
management can verify that the valuations are not exaggerated, and uses a publicly known
algorithm to allocate the new hires to the teams. The allocation algorithm has an impact on
the requests made by players, and in effect, on the instance of the allocation problem that it
will have to solve. Therefore we desire a mechanism that encourages teams to be relatively
abstemious, or not too greedy in choosing their requests, and thereby produces an allocation
yielding near-optimal social welfare.
4.1.1 Related work
We show how related literature fits in our setting, categorizing it along two orthogonal
dimensions: the power of the verification mechanism and communication complexity, or





















PoA 1 + 1/k
marginal greedy
PoA 1
Figure 4.1: Problem settings.
metaphorically, soundness and completeness. Fig. 4.1 classifies existing work within these
dimensions.
No verification, full revelation. This is the most common assumption in the algorithmic
mechanism design literature. Multi-unit auctions model the situation where a verification
mechanism does not exist and thus players must be assumed dishonest. Truthfulness can be
achieved through VCG payments, but doing so depends on solving the allocation problem
optimally, which may be intractable. Starting with the work of Nisan and Ronen [54], the
field of algorithmic mechanism design has sought to reconcile selfishness with computational
complexity. Multi-unit auctions have been studied extensively in this context, including
truthful mechanisms for single-minded bidders [55, 56], and k-minded bidders [57–59].
More recently Procaccia and Tennenholtz ([53]), initiated the study of strategy proof
mechanisms without money, which was followed by the adaptation of many previously studied
mechanism design problems to the non-monetary setting ( [60], [61], [62], [63], [64], [65]).
No verification, partial revelation. The multi item allocation problem has also been
studied in the setting where dishonest players only partially reveal their valuation functions.
The main question in this setting concerns the extent to which limiting communication
complexity affects mechanism efficiency. In [66, 67], for example, bid sizes in a single-item
auction are restricted to real numbers expressed by k bits. In [68], player valuation functions
are only partially revealed because full revelation would require exponential space in the
number of items.
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Partial verification, full revelation. Mechanisms with verification have been introduced
in [54] for selfish settings of the task scheduling problem. The authors show that truthful
mechanisms exist for this problem when the mechanism can detect some of the lies, which is
very natural in this setting. More recently, this results were generalized to mechanisms that
are collusion resistant ([69]), and to more general optimization functions ([70], [71], [72]), as
well as multi parameter players [73].
Full verification, full revelation. If the verification mechanism has full power to ensure
agents’ honesty and players must report their full valuation functions, the supplier has com-
plete information and selfishness on the part of the recipients is irrelevant. This setting can
be modeled as a multiple-choice knapsack problem solvable by FPTAS [74].
4.1.2 Contributions
This chapter extends the study of mechanisms with partial verification to multi unit re-
source allocation. Although polynomial time truthful mechanisms exist for multi unit auc-
tions, these mechanisms require both full revelation of the player type, which may be hard
to compute and communicate, and currency transfer, which may be impractical in some
scenarios. Our work takes advantage of the additional power of verification to provide an
efficient approximation mechanism for scenarios where currency transfer cannot be modeled.
We propose the highest-ratio greedy (HRG) mechanism for the Funding Game, which
provides a Bayesian PoA of 2 under the assumption that valuation functions give diminishing
marginal returns (Theorem 4.3.2). We also provide an algorithm that computes the Nash
equilibrium strategy profile in O(n2 log2m) time and a best response protocol that converges
to a Nash equilibrium profile. We show that an extension of HRG to multiple rounds can
arbitrarily strengthen the pure PoA. In this extension, the supplier partitions the m new
hires into k carefully-sized subsets, and allocates them successively over k consecutive rounds.
We show that this mechanism has a pure PoA of 1 + 1
k
, yielding a graceful tradeoff between
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communication complexity and the PoA (Theorem 4.4.3).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formally introduces
our model for the single round Funding Game and section 4.3 presents our results for this
setting. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 deal with the multiple-round Funding Games.
4.2 Preliminaries
A single-round Funding Game is specified by a set of teams or players {1, ..., n}, a set of
m identical new hires or items, and for each player i a valuation function vi : {0, ...,m} →
R+0 denoting the value i derives from receiving different numbers of items. We assume all
valuation functions satisfy vi(0) = 0, are nondecreasing, and exhibit diminishing marginal
returns:
vi(x)− vi(x− 1) ≥ vi(x+ 1)− vi(x)
A strategy or request of player i is a pair si(xi) = (xi, ṽi(xi)) specifying the number
xi of items requested, and its valuation for these items. A request is valid if and only if
ṽi(x) ≤ vi(x).
A strategy profile is an n-tuple of strategies s = (s1(x1), ..., sn(xn)). We denote by Si the
set of valid strategies for player i, and by S = S1 × ...×Sn the set of valid strategy profiles.
We denote by X = (X1, ..., Xn) an allocation of the items to the players where Xi is the
number of items allocated to player i. Let X be the set of all valid allocations, i.e. all X
such that
∑
i∈[n] Xi ≤ m. A mechanism M : S → X is an allocation algorithm that takes as
input a strategy profile s and outputs an allocation X of the items to the players. We will
denote by XM(s) = (XM1 (s), ..., X
M
n (s)) the output of mechanism M for strategy profile s.
The payoff of player i with valuation vi is its valuation for the number of items it has been
allocated: uMi (vi; s) = vi(X
M
i (s)). If v = (v1, ..., vn) is a valuation function profile we denote
by OPT v an optimal allocation, by sw(OPT v) the social welfare of the optimal allocation,
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i (vi; s) the social welfare of strategy profile s. We use (s
′
i, s−i)
to denote the strategy profile s in which player ith strategy has been replaced by s′i.
A strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium for a Funding Game with valuation functions v
if for any i and any s′i ∈ Si, uMi (vi; s) ≥ uMi (vi; s′i, s−i). The Price of Anarchy (PoA) bounds
the ratio of the optimal social welfare and the social welfare of the worst Nash equilibrium





In incomplete information games we assume that player i’s valuation function vi is drawn
from a set Vi of possible valuation functions, according to some distribution Di. We denote
by D = D1× ...×Dn the product distribution of all players’ valuation functions. A strategy
σi in an incomplete information game is a mapping σi : Vi → Si from the set of the possible
valuation functions to the set of valid requests. Assuming that the distribution D is com-
monly known, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a tuple of strategies σ = (σ1, ..., σn) such
that, for any player i, any valuation function vi ∈ Vi and any alternate pure strategy s′i:
Ev−i∼D−i [uMi (vi;σi(vi), σ−i(v−i)] ≥ Ev−i∼D−i [uMi (vi; s′i, σ−i(v−i)]
The Bayesian Price of Anarchy is defined as the ratio between the expected optimal social






We first observe that the mechanism that solves the induced integer knapsack problem
optimally has an unbounded PoA. This can be shown by the following simple example.
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Assume that n items are to be allocated to n players with valuation functions vi(x) = 1+x∗ε
for all i and x > 0. A Nash equilibrium of this game is when all players request all items.
The mechanism allocates all items to one player resulting in a social welfare of 1 +n · ε. The
optimal allocation will allocate one item to each player for a social welfare of n.
For the remainder of this section we analyze the performance of a simple greedy mecha-
nism in a single shot game. The Highest Ratio Greedy (HRG) mechanism grants the requests
in descending order according to the ratio vi(xi)/xi, breaking ties in the favor of the player
with lower index. If there are not enough items available to satisfy a request completely, the
request is satisfied partially. This is exactly the greedy algorithm for the fractional knapsack
problem. In this section we show that both the pure and Bayesian PoA are 2. An interesting
open problem is whether a mechanism exist for the single round game that improves this
PoA. We make use of the notion of smooth games ([75]) which we review below, cast to
the Funding Games studied here. Since we are only considering the Highest Ratio Greedy
mechanism we will omit the superscript M from all notations in this section.
Definition 4.3.1 (Smooth game [75]). A Funding Game is (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to a
choice function c∗ : V1 × ... × Vn → S and the social welfare objective if, for any valuation






i (v), s−i) ≥ λ · sw(v; c∗(v))− µ · sw(w; s)
The choice function can be thought of as the optimal strategy profile, in our case the
strategy profile in which each player requests the number of items received in an optimal
allocation, when the valuation function profile is v.
Lemma 4.3.1. Let OPT v = (ov1 , ..., o
v
n) be an optimal allocation for valuation profile v and
O : V1 × ...× Vn → S be the optimal strategy choice function, with O(v) = ((ovi , vi(ovi ))i∈[n]).
The Funding Games are (1, 1)-smooth with respect to O and the social welfare objective.
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i )) or integer o
v
i . It will be clear from
context whether oi stands for a request or an integer.
Fix valuation function profiles v and w. For a strategy profile s valid with respect to both
v and w we show that
∑n
i=1 ui(vi; oi, s−i) ≥ sw(v;O(v))− sw(w; s).
Let A = {i : ui(vi; oi, s−i) < ui(vi;O(v))} be the set of players that are allocated more items
in the optimal allocation than in profile (oi, s−i). It is enough to show that
∑




For each player i ∈ A, the value per allocated item at profile (oi, s−i) is at least vi(oi)oi since
by definition i is being allocated less than oi items, and the valuation functions are concave.




·Xi(oi, s−i). By definition, each player i ∈ A would be allocated
fewer items than oi.
Therefore the requests in s−i that have a better value per item ratio sum up to m −
Xi(c
∗
i (v), s−i) items. Since the strategy profile s is assumed to be valid with respect to
valuation function profile w, the valuations expressed in s are at most equal to the valua-
tions w. We can conclude that for any i ∈ A
sw(w; s) ≥ (m−Xi(oi, s−i)) ·
vi(oi)
oi
Then for any i ∈ A, ui(vi; oi, s−i) + sw(w; s) ≥ m · vi(oi)oi . This is true in particular for player





ui(vi; oi, s−i) + sw(w; s) ≥ uj(vj; oj, s−j) + sw(w; s)






which completes the proof.
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Theorem 4.3.2. Both the pure and Bayesian Price of Anarchy for the Funding Games are
equal to 2.
Proof. Since the Funding Games are (1, 1)-smooth with respect to an optimal allocation,
the extension theorem in [75] guarantees that the BPoA is bounded by 2. We now show
that the pure PoA is arbitrarily close to 2. Consider the Funding Game with m items and
two players with valuation functions v1(x) = m and v2(x) = x ∀x > 0. One possible Nash
equilibrium strategy is for both players to request all items. Since the value per item ratios
are equal, only the first player will be allocated, for a social welfare of m. The optimal
solution allocates one item to the first player and m − 1 items to the second player for a
social welfare of 2m−1. Taking m large enough leads to a PoA arbitrarily close to 2.
4.3.1 Complexity of computing the Nash equilibrium
We now present an algorithm that finds the Nash equilibrium in the full information setting
in O(n2 log2m) time. For each player i we use binary search to find the largest request
(αi, vi(αi)) that passes the isSatisfiable test. The isSatisfiable function below assures that
regardless of the other players requests, there will be at least αi items available when the
request of player i is considered by the greedy algorithm. It is easy to see that for the
resulting strategy profile each player receives exactly as many items as requested and that
all items are allocated. We need to show that if player i increases its request then it will
not receive more items. By the construction of αj, for any player j 6= i, player j will receive
at least αj items regardless of the requests of the other players. Therefore player i cannot
receive more than αi = m−
∑
j 6=i αj by changing its request.
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Algorithm 1 isSatisfiable (i, xi)
for all j < i do





for all j > i do







j 6=i xj ≤ m− αi else false
4.4 Multiple-round games
In this section we present our main algorithmic result. We extend the Funding Game intro-
duced in the previous section to multiple rounds, and we show that the PoA of a k-round
Funding Game is 1 + 1
k
, yielding a graceful tradeoff between mechanism complexity and
the social welfare. In a k-round Funding Game, the supplier partitions the m items into
k bundles, which are distributed among the n players in k successive Funding Games or
rounds. We assume that the supplier does not reveal the total number of available items m,
nor the number of rounds k a priori. In our analysis we assume that the players play the
Nash equilibrium strategy myopically, in each individual round. This assumption is in line
with the maximin principle which states that rational players will choose a strategy that
maximizes their minimum payoff. If players never know whether any additional items are
going to be awarded in future rounds, they will try to maximize the utility in the current
round. In the Funding Game, this is equivalent to playing the Nash equilibrium strategy.
As above, we use subscripts to indicate player index; we now use superscripts to indicate




t = m. As before, the players have valuation functions vi : {0, ...,m} → R+0 ,
which are normalized (vi(0) = 0), are nondecreasing, and exhibit diminishing marginal
returns.
Let xti be the number of items requested by player i in game t and let X
t be the allocation
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i be the cumulative number of items allocated to
player i in the first t games, with α0i = 0 for all i. In round t, player i’s valuation function
vti is its marginal valuation given the number of items received in the earlier rounds:
vti(x) = vi(x+ α
t−1
i )− vi(αt−1i )
Observe that these marginal valuations functions vti are normalized, are nondecreasing
and have diminishing marginal returns, just like the full valuation functions vi. G
t will denote
the Funding Game played at round t with mt items and valuation functions vti . Observe that
these individual Funding Games players are playing at each round depend on how items have
been allocated in previous rounds, and indirectly, on players’ strategies in previous rounds.
A strategy or request for player i is a k-tuple si(x
1
i , ..., x
k

















i)) is the request of player i in game t. We use si as a shorthand to denote
the strategy of player i in G, and sti to denote the strategy of player i in game t. A strategy
profile for a k-round Funding Game will refer to an n-tuple of strategies s = (s1, ..., sn) and
a strategy profile for game Gt will refer to the n-tuple of requests of players in round t,
st = (st1, ..., s
t




i ) for the social
welfare of s. Let sw(st) be the social welfare of st. Let ∆t = maxi v
t
i(1) be the highest
marginal value for one item for any player in round t. Observe that ∆t is a nonincreasing
function of t.
Definition 4.4.1. Strategy profile s is a myopic equilibrium for the k-round Funding Game
if for each t, st is a Nash equilibrium of round t. The myopic Price of Anarchy (PoA) bounds
the ratio of the optimal social welfare and the social welfare of the worst myopic equilibrium
in any k-round Funding Game:
PoA = sup
v, myopic NE s
sw(OPT v)
sw(s)
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Our goal is to analyze how a supplier should partition the m items into bundles in order
to obtain as good a PoA as possible. Theorem 4.4.3 in this section shows how the PoA
relates to the choices of bundle ratios, while in the next section we find the bundle ratios
that give the best PoA guarantees.
Lemma 4.4.1. For any myopic Nash equilibrium strategy profile s for a k-round game, we
have ∆t ≥ sw(s
t)
mt
≥ ∆t+1 for each t.
Proof: The first inequality follows from the definition of ∆t and the diminishing returns
assumption.
For the second inequality, suppose ∆t+1 > sw(s
t)
mt
. This would imply that either some items
are not allocated at st (impossible since st is Nash equilibrium and by assumption ∆t+1 > 0)





< ∆t+1 = vt+1j (1), for some
player j. But then j could have successfully requested another item in game Gt, meaning st
is not Nash equilibrium, and so contradiction.
Lemma 4.4.2. For any myopic equilibrium s of a k-round Funding Game, we have:








Theorem 4.4.3. Let yt = m
t/m1. The PoA of the k-round Funding Game with bundle sizes












Proof. Let s be a myopic equilibrium for a k-round game. We will show that there exist
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From Lemma 4.4.2, we have:



























































From (4.2) and (4.3) it follows that for any k-round game with bundle sizes mt, there exist
x1, ..., xk such that:
PoA = 1 + sup
sw(OPT )− sw(s)
sw(s)
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4.5 Evaluating the PoA
In this section we present two results analyzing the expression (4.1) above. Theorem 4.5.1
shows that supremum of this expression taken over all valid choices of xt but fixing yt = t is
1/k. This corresponds to bundle sizes m1, 2 ·m1, ..., k ·m1 for some m1, indicating that the
PoA for such bundle sizes equals 1 + 1/k.
Second, we show that the min-sup of this expression, now also taken over choices of yi,
which corresponds to considering all possible choices of bundle sizes, equals the same value
1/k, indicating that there is no better partition of the items.
Theorem 4.5.1. Let












xi ≥ 1, i = 1, ..., k
Then sup
x
F (x) = 1
k
.



















If we set xi =
i
i−1 , i = 2, ..., k, we have limx1→∞
F (x) = 1
k
. It remains to show that lim
x1→∞
F (x) ≤
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1
k
. We note that the following inequalities are equivalent:
lim
x1→∞



































xj, i = 1, ..., k − 1; zk = 1; z0 = x1z1
Now define a function C : [0,∞)k−1 → R, C(z) =
k∑
i=1
(izi + ik · zizi−1 )−
k∑
i=1
ik. Notice that C
is a function of k − 1 variables since z0 and zk are fixed. Also notice that the domain of C
strictly includes the domain of z as defined in Eq. (4.4). To complete the proof, we show
that C(z) ≥ 0 for any z ∈ [0,∞)k−1. We will do this in two steps: (i) showing that C(z)
has a unique stationary point, and then (ii) showing that C(z) ≥ 0 at any of the domain
boundaries and the stationary point.
C(z) has a unique stationary point. Let a = (a1, ..., ak−1) be a stationary point for








= 0, i = 1, ..., k − 1 (4.5)
We show now by induction that each ai can be written as a function of a1. For the base
case, let a0 = x1 · a1 = f0(a1) and f1(a1) = a1.
Now assume that ai−1 = fi−1(a1) and ai = fi(a1). Then we will define ai+1 as a function of
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where fi+1(·) is the name given to the expression in Eq. (4.6) as a function of a1.
Therefore the equations ai = fi(a1), i = 1, ..., k− 1 uniquely define a stationary point a with
respect to a1. To show that the stationary point a is unique, we only need to show that
fk(a1) = 1 has a unique solution. For this it is sufficient to show that the derivative of fk
with respect to a1 is always positive: f
′
k(a1) > 0.
We show this by induction on i = 0, ..., k. Let hi =
fi
fi−1
, i = 2, ..., k − 1. The inductive
hypothesis is that f ′i(a1) > 0, i = 1, ..., k and hj(a1) > 0 and h
′
j(a1) > 0, j = 2, ..., k.
For the base case, observe the following:
f1(a1) = a1 > 0 and f
′




















Now assume that f ′i(a1) > 0, hi(a1) > 0, and h
′





i+1(a1) are all strictly positive:
f ′i+1(a1) = h
′






















· h′i(a1) > 0
This shows that the equation fk(a1) = 1 has a unique solution, and thus concludes step (i).




satisfies Eq. (4.6), i = 1, ..., k and hence a = (a1, ..., ak−1) is the unique stationary
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Let b = (b1, ..., bk−1) be a boundary point. Then we must show that C(b) ≥ 0. Since b











The only negative term is
∑k
i=1 ik, which is constant with respect to b. If bj = 0 for
some j, then the positive term (i+ 1)k · bi+1
bi
is infinite and C(b) > 0. On the other hand, if
bj =∞ for some j, then the positivwe term ik · bibi+1 is infinite and again C(b) > 0. Steps (i)
and (ii) above show that C(z) ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ [0,∞)k−1 and therefore C(z) ≥ 0 on the restricted
domain of equation (4.4), which completes the proof.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we introduced the Funding Game, a novel formulation of resource allocation
for players whose valuation declarations can be verified, but reveal only partial information.
We analyzed the PoA for the pure and Bayesian Nash equilibrium and showed that allocating
the resources in multiple successive rounds can improve the pure PoA arbitrarily close to 1.
There are two directions in which this work can be extended. First, our mechanism relies
on the assumption that the valuation functions are concave. An interesting open problem
is finding an efficient mechanism for more general valuation functions. Second, it might
be desirable to develop efficient verification mechanisms for combinatorial settings, where




This chapter is based on work presented at ASONAM, 2015 [50]. We attempt to understand
how collaborative teams work towards solving problems, being particularly interested in: 1)
within a particular team, how can we evaluate the cohesiveness of the team? 2) within a
large network of potential collaborators, how can we identify teams that are likely to be
highly effective?
In this effort, we construct a network-based mathematical model for collaborative work,
use statistical learning techniques to motivate a focus on leader-based metrics for team eval-
uation, and discuss the algorithmic and complexity concerns inherent to this problem. As
prescribed by much of the existing literature, incorporating all of the information about
the pairwise connections between collaborators makes the problem of finding the most ef-
fective group computationally intractable. Instead, we demonstrate that the effectiveness
of a team can be predicted nearly as well using only a vanishing fraction of these pairwise
measurements. Moreover, by discarding most of the information, we make the problem
computationally tractable.
94
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5.1.1 Related Work
Understanding what are the components that contribute to successful team formation has
long been the focus of researchers in various disciplines. A great deal of effort has been put
into empirical studies of team performance of various sizes in multiple areas. Levine and
Moreland in [76] publish their findings on the performance of small teams and have concluded
that their progress depends on both individual skill and group cohesiveness. Hauptman and
Hirji [77] monitored individual behaviour and communication patterns in tens of projects
from companies in various countries and industries and found a positive correlation between
individual interdependence and team performance.
More recently, research in the operation research community has been directed at find-
ing analytical models for good team selection in projects that require multiple individuals
with various sets of skills. Zakarian and Kusiak [78] build a mathematical programming
model in which team membership is prioritized based on costumer requirements or product
characteristics: hard constraints the members of the team must satisfy, either individually
or collectively. Baykasoglu et al. [79] develop a fuzzy model aiming to address the impre-
cise nature of the problem. Their model is optimizing for the inclusion in the team of a
varying array of hard and soft skills since the actual performance of individuals is not gen-
erally known from the get-go. Citing previous research that provided arguments for linking
successful teams with group communication, Chen and Lin [80] include in their model a
personality profiling indicator in addition to teamwork capability, communication skills and
domain specific knowledge of individual team members.
Although many of the models proposed before took into account the importance of group
communication and team cohesiveness, these were generally modelled as a set of indicators
of individual team members. It wasn’t until the work of Lappas, Liu and Terzi [81] that
the pairwise collaboration, or compatibility, between any two members of the team has been
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considered. Since every pair of individuals is assigned a compatibility score, the pool of
candidates for membership in the team can be seen as a social network. Besides raising
some interesting algorithmic problems, their work also implicitly posed the question of what
are the meaningful ways to aggregate the pairwise compatibility between different members
of a team, to a team cohesiveness score.
Different aggregation functions lead to algorithmic problems that differ substantially in
their computational complexity and the resulting team structure. While in [81] the authors
argue a cohesive team has small diameter or minimum spanning tree in the social network
subgraph induced by the team, in their experiments this assumption often leads to large
teams in which many of the team members are selected just to minimize the shortest path
distance between individuals who possess the required skills. A similar model is adopted
by Datta, Majumder and Naidu [82] with the objective of minimizing the maximum edge
in any Steiner tree. Gajewar and Sarma [83] adopts the subgraph density (the ratio of the
number of edges to the number of vertices) as the metric by which to measure cohesiveness
while Li and Shan [48] use the average (weighted) degree of each individual in the subgraph.
However, all of those metrics still suffer from the same flaw: they don’t take into account
the size of the team and often include individuals that don’t add any desired hard skills, but
only make the team appear more cohesive.
In the model introduced by Kargar and An [47] the team quality is judged by the sum of
the distances between each pair of individuals which in general leads to much smaller teams.
They consider for the first time in this line of research teams with a leader, or what we
refer to as the star topology, in which only the compatibility between the leader and the rest
of the team is considered. They show that good teams with a leader are computationally
easy to find, and also give algorithms for finding multiple teams (with or without leader)
for independent projects. Rangapuram, Buhler and Hein also address the problem of large
teams by presenting heuristics that take as input a bound on the team size to be specified,
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and a predetermined group of experts which are required to be part of the team. However,
their solutions are only tested experimentally.
Other team formation literature has been concerned with online settings ([84]), where the
goal is to allocate jobs fairly to individuals while still maintaining good team connectedness,
minimizing the overall cost of the team ([85]) when each expert has an associated cost and
pairwise compatibility reflects in the functioning cost of the team, or finding teams that can
complete multiple projects, each one of them associated with a payoff ([86]).
The team formation model we propose leads to problems that are closely related to
the graph packing literature. In the graph packing problem one is given an undirected,
unweighted graph G and a collection of undirected, unweighted graphs G, and has the task of
finding a collectionM of disjoint subgraphs of G such that every element ofM is isomorphic
to an element of G. When G contains only a single edge graph, the graph packing problem
is equivalent to the maximum matching problem. Hell and Kirkpatrick [31] showed that
the problem is NP-complete for any collection G that is not of the form {K1,1, K1,2, ..., K1,T}
where T ≥ 1 is an integer and K1,t is the star with t leaves. When the edges are weighted even
this special case is NP-complete with the best known approximation algorithm developed by





for packing triangles in a graph have been presented in [27] and [13] while the packing of
paths of sizes two and three has been studied in [27], [13], [87], [88], [10] and [11].
5.1.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter we make several contributions towards an understanding of how teams col-
laborate effectively. First, we propose a robust, versatile, and realistic mathematical model
based on a social network architecture. Second, we use statistical evidence from real-world
data to understand what features of the social network within a team are relevant to team
effectiveness. Contrary to previous assumptions, we find that it is not necessary to consider
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all pairwise connections between collaborators in order to accurately predict the effective-
ness of a group. Rather, the connections between the “leader” of the team and the other
members are most important, the marginal predictive accuracy of the connections between
other team members being small relative to the computational advantages of discarding most
of the data. Third, we discuss how our method dramatically improves the computational
complexity of the problem.
In Section 5.2, we describe our mathematical model of team collaboration, and our statis-
tical model for learning about how teams effectively collaborate. The results of our statistical
modeling on the DBLP data set is presented in Section 5.3, and our concluding remarks fol-
low in Section 5.4.
5.2 Modeling
In this section, we present our mathematical model for collaboration on tasks. While our
mathematical model is sufficiently general to model a variety of realistic scenarios, some of
our language refers specifically to the setting of researchers writing papers collaboratively.
This is simply a reflection of the fact that our primary data set is the DBLP, which contains
information about authorship in computer science.
5.2.1 Mathematical Model
Let P be a set of workers, and let y be a set of tasks. Our goal is to understand how
collaboration among the workers translates into success at completing tasks.
Among the workers we define a function h : P → R+ that assigns an expertise value to
each worker. In our DBLP example, we let h(p) be the h-index of the researcher p. The
h-index of a researcher is the largest integer H such that the researcher published at least H
papers, each of which received at least H citations, and is generally believed to be a good
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indication of a researcher’s impact.
We measure two different types of collaboration among workers: pairwise collaboration
between two workers, and team cohesiveness among three or more workers. To measure
pairwise collaboration between researchers we posit five different functions wj : P ×P → R+
and we compare results based on different choices for the collaboration function:
1. Binary. Have these two researchers collaborated on a paper:
w1(p1, p2) =

1 if p1, p2 are co-authors
0 otherwise
2. H-index. Let A,B be the set of papers authored by p1 and p2, respectively. Then
w2(p1, p2) = h-index(A ∩B).
3. Citations. The total number of citations that all joint papers of the two researchers
received. Let cit(A) denote the total number of citations papers in set A received.
Then,
w3(p1, p2) = cit(A ∩B).
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Thus, each pairwise collaboration function wj defines a worker network Gj = (P, 2
P , wj),
where edges of zero weight correspond to non-existent edges.
A team of workers is a subgraph of the worker network, and we assume any team has a
collaboration topology: an unweighted subgraph of the team graph in which an edge between
two workers denotes the fact that the respective workers will have to collaborate. Therefore,
we consider the following problem:
Problem 5.2.1. Given a weighted graph G = (VG, EG, w) and an unweighted graph T (VT , ET )
find a one to one mapping g : VT → VG which maximizes
fT (g) = f(h(g(u1)), h(g(u2)), . . . , h(g(uk)),
w1(g(u1), g(u2)), . . . , w(k2)
(g(uk−1, g(uk))),
where k is the number of vertices in T .
In other words, we want to find a team of workers and assign them to the different
nodes of the team graph (representing different job assignments), such that collaboration is
maximized between all relevant pairs: the workers that are assigned to nodes connected by an
edge in the graph T . We call T the collaboration topology of the team, and f(g) the cohesive
index of the worker assignment g. Clearly, the difficulty of computing an optimal worker
assignment depends on the structure of graph T . We are interested in particular in comparing
the advantages and disadvantages of creating teams with star versus clique collaboration
topology. Observe that the star topology corresponds to a strictly hierarchical team structure
with one leader and many independent workers, while the clique topology corresponds to a
strictly flat, leaderless, team structure. While teams in real world organizations don’t usually
have either a perfectly flat nor perfectly hierarchical structure, we find that, for clarity, is
useful to compare and contrast these two extreme topologies. When the graph T is a clique
we will refer to problem 5.2.1 as the MAX-TEAMproblem, and when the graph T is a star
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we will refer to the problem as the MAX-STARproblem.
When the size of T is k and all the edges of G are either 0 or 1, the MAX-TEAMproblem
is equivalent to deciding whether there exists a clique of size k inG (the MAX-CLIQUEproblem)
and is therefore NP-hard. However, the MAX-STARproblem can be solved in time polyno-
mial in the size of the team and the size of G. A simple algorithm for this problem first finds
for each worker v the best star centered at v by simply selecting the heaviest k − 1 edges
of G incident to v; then, it returns the best such star. Thus, while the problem statements
are similar, their computational complexities are very different. The difference is obviously
that in the first problem, all team subgroups—of which there are exponentially many—are
equally important, whereas in the second case only the relation between the star center and
the closest collaborators is important. The goal of our experimental section is to justify
interest in MAX-STARin the service of answering the question posed by MAX-TEAM.
More generally, we consider the question of how to meaningfully reduce the information
embedded in any given subgraph of our social network into a single number. Our results
suggest that a function which considers only a small fraction of the information in G can be
just as effective in addressing the real-world question of interest.
Clique Topology. One reasonable way [48, 83] to assess the collaborative strength of the
team is to assume that all of the pairwise collaborations are relevant, and simply take the
average of the edge weights. Since all of the edge weights (some of which may be 0) are







Note that using the clique topology to assess team strength implicitly asserts that all
pairwise collaboration ties are meaningful. Although this may be reasonable, it has the
downside of being computationally difficult. That is, to find the strongest team in a graph is
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equivalent to solving the MAX-CLIQUE problem, which is not only NP-hard, but also hard
to approximate [89].
Star Topology. Conversely, we consider an alternative assessment of team strength based
on the star topology. Here, we assert that only some of the ties between workers are meaning-
ful. In particular, we assert that only the pairwise collaboration between a single team leader
and the other members of the team are important. Critically, this dramatically reduces the
complexity of the computational problem, since finding the maximum-weighted star can be
solved in polynomial time.










While the preceding discussion presents computational motivation for focusing on stars as
opposed to cliques, this motivation is pointless if collaboration cannot be meaningfully char-
acterized on the star topology. Thus, we perform statistical analysis on the DBLP data set
that justifies our focus on stars.
Generally, we consider the problem of learning a function f : 2G → R+ that models
collaboration accurately.
We consider this problem in the context of machine learning. That is, given a vector of
outcomes y, and a matrix of attributes X, what function f minimizes the (squared) difference
between f(X) and y? The difficulty is that in our problem X is not a matrix—but rather
it is a subgraph with weighted nodes and weighted edges. What function most accurately
aggregates this information into a prediction?
In our analysis, y is the number of citations earned by papers listed in DBLP. Thus,
we must learn a function f , taking as its input a weighted subgraph of authors and their
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pairwise connections, that predicts the number of citations that a paper written by that
group of authors would produce.
The function fstar presented above is one such function, but most likely it is not the best
one. We tested a variety of candidate functions with various properties.
The performance of functions based on the star topology leads us to consider the possi-
bility that only a few of those “spokes” are in fact meaningful. With q∗ defined as above, let
w1, w2, . . . , wk be the edge weights between q
∗ and every other member of the team, sorted
from largest to smallest. Then we consider the regression model
fstar,reg(Q) = β0 + β1 · w1 + · · ·+ βk · wk + ε ,
where ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε ) for some constant variance σ2ε . We use training data from the DBLP to
estimate the values of the βi’s.
5.2.3 Validation
For any collaboration function f , we can measure the root mean squared error (RMSEf ) of







where Qi ⊆ P is the set of authors of the ith paper, and yi is the number of citations earned
by the ith paper.
Functions that produce smaller RMSE are more accurate, and are thus preferred. Our
analysis demonstrates that collaboration functions based on the star topology are competitive
with those based on the clique topology.
Problem 5.2.2. Collaboration: Given a weighted network G = (V,E,w), a vector of
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outcomes y, and a map M : 2|G|→ y that maps subgraphs of G to elements of y, find a
function f : 2G → R+ that minimizes ||f(Q)− y||22 (e.g. RMSEf) over all subsets Q ⊆ V .
5.3 Experimental Results
In this section we describe our efforts to learn about the collaboration function that translates
attributes of researchers in the DBLP into predictions about how many citations their papers
will earn. The DBLP contains data about computer science authorship, and we obtained
data about the number of citations earned by each paper from [90].
5.3.1 Small Teams
In the first experiment we evaluated how well different combinations of pairwise collaboration
functions and team collaboration topology assumptions predict the strength of a team. The
data set we used for this experiment consists of 24,020 papers with at most five authors
published in eight journals and twenty conferences in theoretical computer science between
1954 and 2002. This data was then further divided into two subsets: training data consisting
of 21,006 papers published from 1954-2000, and testing data consisting of the remaining 3,014
papers published in 2001-2002.
We evaluate each of the combinations of the pairwise collaboration function with a team
collaboration aggregation function compared to the observed strength of a team: the num-
ber of citations the newly published paper received. We use the Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient (PCC) to assess how good the author collaboration and aggregation
functions are. The PCC of two random variables is a number between −1 and 1 describing
how the variables are correlated. I our setting, a PCC of 1 would suggest that the number
of ciatations of a paper grows proportionally with the team cohesiveness, while a PPC of
0 would suggest that team cohesiveness does not have any predictive power in identifying
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successful teams. The PCC of two random variables is defined as the covariance of the two
variables divided by the product of their standard deviations:
ρX,Y =
E[(X − µX)(Y − µY )]
σXσY
Table 5.1: PPC between team cohesiveness and number of citations with different pairwise







Table 5.1 shows how the prediction of the team strength based on previous collaboration
of authors is related to the number of citations of respective papers. Each row shows the
results for a different function for computing the pairwise author collaboration, as described
in section 5.2. The columns show the results when different team collaboration topologies
are considered.
In each cell we list the Pearson correlation coefficients between the team cohesiveness
score and the number of citations of a paper. For example, when the pairwise collaboration
between two authors is calculated as the total number of citations the authors received from
common papers, and the team collaboration topology is assumed to be a clique, then the
team cohesiveness score had a .194 Pearson correlation with the number of citations the
paper received. It is interesting to notice that the best correlation is achieved in the setting
that considers the least amount of information: the star topology with the binary pairwise
collaboration function. The binary collaboration function is the simplest, in that it only
records whether two authors collaborated previously or not, without taking into account
the performance of the teams in which the authors collaborated previously. Besides, the
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correlation coefficient is always better when the star topology is assumed than when the
collaboration between all pairs of authors are given equal importance.
It is surprising as well to observe that some author collaboration functions don’t perform
as well as one would expect. The Jaccard index based collaboration functions do not show a
relevant correlation to the number of citations in any of the team collaboration topologies.
This collaboration function has been used in the experimental evaluation sections of [83] and
[81]. To get a perspective on the relevance of the correlation coefficients in Table 5.1 note
that a (positive or negative) Pearson correlation coefficient of .037 can occur by coincidence
in unrelated distributions with a probability of about 10%, while a coefficient of .15 can
occur in unrelated distributions with a probability of 10−6.
We also analyzed the the correlation between the number of citations and the sum of the
author expertise or h-indexes to obtain a better correlation: .323. This confirms the common
sense expectation that individual expertise is most crucial to the success of a team, but, the
small difference between this correlation coefficient and the best correlation coefficients in
table 5.1 suggests that choosing team members that collaborate well is almost as important
as choosing team members with high expertise.
5.3.2 Large teams
This data set consists of 622,094 papers published in a wide array of venues between 1990
and 2003. From this data we were able to construct a graph G with 43,453 authors, having
between them 181,812 pairwise connections, and authoring 240,621 papers.
Given the larger size of the latter data set, we focus our presentation here on those results.
However, the results from the smaller data set were consistent.
As noted in Section 5.2, we take as input a large social network G, where the nodes are
weighted by the h-index of each author on all papers published before 2001. Similarly, the
pairwise connections between authors were computed as the h-index of the shared publi-
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cations of those authors on all papers published before 2001. Thus, the background data
embedded in G consists entirely of publications before 2001.
The results of testing six regression-based prediction models are shown in Table 5.3 and
Table 5.4. Each model is evaluated in terms of its ability to estimate the logarithm of the
number of citations of each paper (+1). That is, the response variable is ln(citations + 1)
and thus the units of the RMSE figures are in log-citations. The models are as follows:
• mean: assign every paper the mean number of citations. This serves as our baseline.
• year: since papers only accrue more citations over time, use the year in which the
paper was published to predict its citations. Here, both a linear and quadratic term
for year are allowed.
• numAuthors: use the number of authors on the paper to predict citations. It is
assumed that there is no correlation between citations and number of authors, but this
serves as a useful verification of a random noise model.
• density: density(G) = 1
(n2)
∑
e∈E(G) w(e). This captures the idea from the clique topol-
ogy that all edges are important, and that teams with stronger pairwise connections
will perform better.




, where NG(v) is the neighborhood of v in G.
This captures the idea from the star topology that only the mostly strongly-connected
member of the team is important.
• topTwo: use the largest two h-indices and the largest two edge weights in the subgraph
to predict the number of citations. While not a star topology, this captures the notion
that only the two best researchers and two strongest ties are important. The magnitude
of the other weights in the subgraph are less important.






















Figure 5.1: An example team graph.
An example illustrating these collaboration functions in shown in Figure 5.1. Here, we
consider the paper “A community authorization service for group collaboration”, published in
2002 by Laura Pearlman, Von Welch, Ian T. Foster, Carl Kesselman, and Steven Tuecke [91].
The h-indices and joint h-indices of the five co-authors prior to 2001 are indicated numerically
in the figure. This paper has received 504 citations.
Table 5.2 shows the predictions of the six models above for the paper considered in Figure
5.1. The mean citations predicted by the baseline model is 17.5 (for all papers). In this case,
only the topTwo model performs significantly better than that. While the scale of the scores
is irrelevant, and the details of how these scores translate into predicted citations are omitted,
what should be clear is how the topology of this group is reflected in the different scores. In
this example, three people with high h-indices have very strong connections, while two people
appear to new to the group, and perhaps computer science research in general. Although in
this example, the density metric performs slightly better than the star, it is clear how the
strength of a few people can drive the success of the group.
Table 5.3 compares the performance of each of these function on the training data,
which consisted of 15,845 papers which had at least three authors. As expected, year and
numAuthors are largely indistinguishable from the baseline model that simply uses the
mean. Moreover, the model based on density is not much better. However, predictions
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Table 5.2: The predicted number of citations for each of six prediction models, for the paper
whose collaboration graph is shown in Figure 5.1.







based on the star metrics offer a considerable improvement, and focusing on the topTwo is
even better.
Table 5.3: Results from in-sample testing of various collaboration functions on the DBLP.








In Table 5.4, we compare the performance of these same functions on a hold-out set of
13,753 papers on which they were not trained. The conclusions are largely the same. While
the density metric performs better than the baseline model against this sample, it is still
surpassed by the star and topTwo models.
In Figures 5.2 and 5.3, we show the bivariate relationship between the actual number of
citations earned by each paper, and the team cohesiveness score with the star metric and
density metric respectively.
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Table 5.4: Results from out-of-sample testing of various collaboration functions on the DBLP.









In this section we present the limitations of our work, explore avenues for future study, and
summarize our findings.
5.4.1 Limitations & Future Work
We have explored only a small portion of the infinite space of potential collaboration func-
tions. Our motivation in this effort was to find collaboration functions that led to com-
putationally tractable algorithms that performed as well or better than exponential time
algorithms necessary for MAX-TEAM. In that effort we have been successful, but it is
certain that these collaboration are not optimal. A worthwhile goal for future study would
be to explore the infinite space of potential collaboration functions to find an optimal one.
Here, we have considered only the DBLP data set, which is specific to computer scientists
writing academic papers. Thus, our conclusions about the usefulness of the star topology
relative to the clique topology apply narrowly to this setting. While we suspect that finding
likely extends to other application domains, we have no evidence other than intuition to
support this claim.
One challenging aspect of this data set was the heavily right-skewed distributions for h-
index and number of citations. This was especially troublesome for the response variable of
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Figure 5.2: Paper citations vs. the team cohesiveness score using the star metric and number
of citations.
number of citations. While our remedy of taking the logarithm was an improvement, a more
careful study might explore more sophisticated statistical transformations. In particular,
both quantities appear to follow zero-inflated negative binomial distributions (see Figure
5.4). It seems likely that successfully transforming these variables could result in more
accurate predictions.
5.4.2 Conclusion
The question of how people collaborate most effectively is both important and not fully
understood. We used the DBLP database of computer science authorship to address this
question. Whereas previous research focused on the strength of ties among all members of
a team, we focused on the strength of ties among only some of the members of a team. In
particular, we used the DBLP to provide experimental justification for a focus on the star
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of the Logarithm of the Number of Citations. Each line represents
one year from 1990 to 2003. Note the zero-inflation and right-skewed distribution.
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topology over the clique topology. This experiment evidence suggests that metrics based on
the star topology are competitive with those based on the clique, but are computationally
tractable. This makes a practical case for using the star topology when mining for effective
subgroups in large social networks.
Bibliography
[1] Kurt Lewin. Group decision and social change. Readings in social psychology, 3:197–211,
1947.
[2] J. Richard Hackman. The design of work teams. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1987.
[3] Daniel Levi. Group dynamics for teams. Sage Publications, 2015.
[4] Warren Bennis and Patricia Biederman. Organizing genius. Basic Books, 2007.
[5] Richard Guzzo and Marcus Dickson. Teams in organizations: Recent research on per-
formance and effectiveness. Annual review of psychology, 47(1):307–338, 1996.
[6] Charles Evans and Kenneth Dion. Group cohesion and performance: A meta-analysis.
Small group research, 22(2):175–186, 1991.
[7] Michael Campion, Gina Medsker, and Catherine Higgs. Relations between work group
characteristics and effectiveness: Implications for designing effective work groups. Per-
sonnel psychology, 46(4):823–847, 1993.
[8] Sven O. Krumke and Clemens Thielen. The generalized assignment problem with min-
imum quantities. European Journal of Operational Research, 228(1):46–55, 2013.
[9] R. Hassin and S. Rubinstein. An approximation algorithm for maximum triangle pack-
ing. Discrete Applied Math., 154(6):971 – 979, 2006.
[10] R. Tanahashi and Z. Chen. A deterministic approximation algorithm for maximum
2-path packing. IEICE Trans. on Information and Systems, February 2010.
[11] Anke van Zuylen. Multiplying pessimistic estimators: Deterministic approximation of
max tsp and maximum triangle packing. COCOON, pages 60–69, 2010.
[12] R. Hassin and O. Schneider. A local search algorithm for binary maximum 2-path
partitioning. Discrete Optimization, 10(4):333 – 360, 2013.
[13] Z.Z. Chen, R. Tanahashi, and L. Wang. An improved randomized approximation al-




[14] Amotz Bar-Noy and George Rabanca. Tight approximation bounds for the seminar
assignment problem. In International Workshop on Approximation and Online Algo-
rithms, pages 170–182. Springer, 2016.
[15] Marco Bender, Clemens Thielen, and Stephan Westphal. A constant factor approxi-
mation for the generalized assignment problem with minimum quantities and unit size
items. Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, pages 135–145, 2013.
[16] Marco Bender, Clemens Thielen, and Stephan Westphal. Erratum: A constant factor
approximation for the generalized assignment problem with minimum quantities and
unit size items. Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, pages E1–E3, 2013.
[17] Dirk G. Cattrysse and Luk N. Van Wassenhove. A survey of algorithms for the gener-
alized assignment problem. European Journal of Operational Research, 60(3):260 – 272,
1992.
[18] O. Erhun Kundakcioglu and Saed Alizamir. Generalized assignment problem, pages
1153–1162. Springer US, Boston, MA, 2009.
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